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FAILURE TO CAPTURE: WHY BUSINESS DOES NOT CONTROL
THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
GABRIEL SCHEFFLER *
ABSTRACT
Leading figures on both the political right and the political left have
concluded that the agency rulemaking process is captured: that it serves to
benefit businesses, at the expense of the general public. This perception appears to be supported by recent theoretical and empirical scholarship and
has prompted lawmakers to introduce various proposals to reform the federal rulemaking process.
Yet as I will demonstrate in this Article, the view of the rulemaking process as captured is unwarranted. I will show that the academic literature
actually provides little guidance as to the magnitude of business influence—
that is, the extent to which businesses are able to achieve their desired regulatory outcomes. Drawing on an extensive and original empirical investigation of the Tank Car Rule, a major rule issued by the Department of Transportation in 2015, I will uncover several key limitations on business influence
in the rulemaking process. Taken together, these limitations show that businesses do not routinely exert anything approaching systematic control over
the federal rulemaking process.
This conclusion undercuts two prominent concerns associated with the
capture account of regulation by showing that the regulatory process may
still serve the public interest, and by defusing a possible threat to the democratic legitimacy of agency rules. In addition, it provides reason to disfavor
major reforms to the rulemaking process, and suggests that some proposed
reforms could even have the opposite effect and serve to augment business
influence.
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INTRODUCTION
A growing chorus of prominent voices on both the political right and
the political left have concluded that interest groups have captured the administrative state. For instance, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse has written that
“agency capture is . . . a threat to the integrity of government,” 1 and warned
that the “ever-deepening reach of corporate interests into our environmental
regulator will have consequences for this generation and those to come.” 2
Similarly, Senator Mike Lee has stated that “regulatory capture is one of the
most pressing political, economic, and moral issues of our time.” 3 Observers
have attributed a number of recent catastrophes—ranging from the Great Recession of 2008 to the BP oil spill—to such regulatory capture. 4
Much of this criticism has focused in particular on the role that interest
groups—and more specifically, businesses—play in the administrative rulemaking process: the process by which federal administrative agencies issue
1. Sheldon Whitehouse, How Government Can Root Out Regulatory Capture, REGULATORY
REV. (June 15, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/06/15/whitehouse-how-governmentcan-root-out-regulatory-capture/.
2. Sheldon Whitehouse, The Corporate Capture of EPA, MEDIUM (Oct. 4, 2017), https://medium.com/@senwhitehouse/the-corporate-capture-of-epa-7e2652624c84.
3. Mike Lee, Fighting Regulatory Capture in the 21st Century, REGULATORY REV. (Jun. 16,
2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/06/16/lee-fighting-regulatory-capture-in-the-21st-century/.
4. Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds.,
2014).
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regulations. 5 Senator Elizabeth Warren has written that “[w]hen it comes to
undue industry influence, our rulemaking process is broken from start to finish.” 6 The rulemaking process is, of course, enormously consequential: For
decades, the vast majority of federal laws have been issued by administrative
agencies, and interest groups consider participating in administrative rulemaking to be as important, or more important, than lobbying Congress. 7 Under the regulatory capture view, businesses control the rulemaking process,
with the result that regulation serves primarily to benefit them at the expense
of the general public. 8
In response, government policymakers have increasingly investigated
allegations of regulatory capture and proposed various reforms to the rulemaking process in order to reduce capture. 9 For example, Senator Warren
has introduced a bill which would, among other things, impose additional
disclosure requirements, install a public advocate into the regulatory process,
and prevent the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) from

5. This Article follows Professors Cornelius Kerwin and Scott Furlong’s definition of interest groups, which includes “companies, business and trade associations, unions, other levels of government, and . . . public interest groups.” CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG,
RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 189 (4th ed. 2011).
However, I use slightly different terminology: I use the term businesses to refer to individual firms,
industry associations to refer to organizations that represent groups of businesses, and business
interests to refer to both individual businesses and industry associations.
6. Elizabeth Warren, Corporate Capture of the Rulemaking Process, REGULATORY REV.
(June 14, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/06/14/warren-corporate-capture-of-the-rulemaking-process.
7. Scott R. Furlong, Interest Group Influence on Rule Making, 29 ADMIN. & SOC. 325, 333–
334 (1997); Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rulemaking:
A Decade of Change, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 360 (2004).
8. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 13 (defining regulatory capture as “the result or
process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from
the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the
industry itself”); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 (1990) (defining the
“capture” theory of regulation as the notion that “government regulation reflects the influence of
special interests, and is created and operated for their advantage”).
9. See, e.g., Regulatory Capture Prevention Act of 2011, S. 1338, 112th Cong. (2011); Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010);
Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture, COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY (Aug. 3, 10:00 AM) https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/protecting-the-publicinterest-understanding-the-threat-of-agency-capture (providing a video of the Senate Subcommittee
Hearing and prepared written statements of witnesses); see also Jonathan Spicer, Exclusive: U.S.
Watchdog to Probe Fed’s Lax Oversight of Wall Street, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-probe-exclusive-idUSKCN0W62C0 (“Ranking representatives Maxine
Waters of the House Financial Services Committee and Al Green of the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations asked the Government Accountability Office on Oct. 8 to launch a probe of ‘regulatory capture’ and to focus on the New York Fed, according to a letter obtained by Reuters.”).
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communicating with non-executive branch officials. 10 Meanwhile, in 2017,
the then-Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (“REINS Act”), which
would require Congress to affirmatively approve most new major regulations, subjecting them to the same process as legislation. 11 Proponents of the
REINS Act have argued that putting more decision-making authority in the
hands of Congress would (perhaps counter-intuitively) curb interest group
influence by rendering the regulatory process more subject to public scrutiny. 12
At first glance, a burgeoning body of empirical research in law and political science appears to support the view that the rulemaking process has
been captured. This research consistently finds that businesses disproportionately participate in the rulemaking process, and some research even purports to show that this disproportionate participation by business leads to
greater influence over the content of the rules that agencies issue. 13 At the

10. Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity Act, S. 3357, 115th Cong. §§ 306, 309 (2018).
11. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th Cong. § 3
(2017).
12. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Placing “Reins” on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed
REINS Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 32 (2013) (“The primary effect of the REINS Act
would . . . [be] to ensure that those major regulations adopted are those that can command majority
legislative support, not merely those that are endorsed by concentrated or highly motivated interests . . . .”); Lee, supra note 3 (“One of the unintended—but indisputable—consequences of Congress recasting itself as the backseat driver of American government has been to move the bulk of
lawmaking into the bureaucracy, where the opaque and highly technical decision-making process
facilitates regulatory capture by concentrated interests.”); John W. York, REINS Act Opposition
Displays Contempt for Consent of the Governed, FEDERALIST (Mar. 17, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/03/17/reins-act-opposition-displays-contempt-consent-governed/ (“By requiring congressional approval for major regulations, the REINS Act threatens this arrangement. If passed, it
will cut special interests’ influence, leaving them to fight for Congress’s attention and the public’s
approval.”). Even some policymakers who do not support the REINS Act have echoed the idea that
the rulemaking process’s lack of transparency renders it more susceptible to interest group influence
than the legislative process. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator from Mass., Tilting the
Scales: Corporate Capture of the Rulemaking Process, Remarks at the Administrative Conference
of the United States: Regulatory Capture Forum 1–2 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-3-3_Warren_ACUS_Speech.pdf (“The tilt in Congress is pretty much
out there for everyone to see. . . . But corporate influence works its magic even better in the shadows—and that’s where rulemaking occurs.”).
13. See, e.g., Simon F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
507 (2015); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99 (2011); William F. West
& Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications for Bureaucratic Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 495 (2013); Jason Webb Yackee
& Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S.
Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006); Susan Webb Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During
Regulatory Policymaking, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE
AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 292 [hereinafter Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture];
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same time, a resurgence in theoretical scholarship about regulatory capture
has brought attention to structural features of the federal regulatory system
that may cause even well-intentioned regulators to favor business interests
over public interest groups and individual members of the public. 14
This Article will argue that the view of the rulemaking process as captured is not warranted—that the rulemaking process is not “broken.” It will
show that although recent scholarship finds that businesses participate more
and exert more influence in the rulemaking process than other types of interest groups, there are still important unresolved questions about the magnitude
of business influence in the rulemaking process. Neither the theoretical literature on agency capture nor the empirical literature on interest group influence in the rulemaking process demonstrates that businesses routinely control
regulatory outcomes, nor does this literature undercut the possibility that
agencies for the most part are able to pursue public interested regulations in
the face of industry pressure.
This Article will uncover several important limitations on business influence through an in-depth empirical case study of the “Tank Car Rule,” a
major safety regulation promulgated by the Department of Transportation
(“DOT”) in 2015 that aimed to increase the safety of flammable liquids
shipped by rail. Drawing on an original analysis of thousands of public submissions to DOT during the Tank Car Rule rulemaking process, as well as
interviews with officials and interest group representatives involved in this
process, I uncover four key reasons why businesses have less influence than
the existing evidence suggests. First, even when business interests are in
general agreement that they would like the rule to be less stringent overall,
they differ on important issues on a given rule. Second, even when the overall stringency of a rule shifts in the direction that business interests generally
desire, they still are unlikely to receive their full desired changes. Third, examining businesses interests’ influence at specific stages of the rulemaking
process—most notably, the notice-and-comment period—likely overstates
their influence on the rule as a whole. Fourth, by several measures, business
interests make more limited and realistic requests during the notice-and-comment period than individual members of the public and public interest groups.

Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking during Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 (2012) [hereinafter Yackee,
The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying]; Andrei A. Kirilenko, Shawn Mankad & George Michailidis,
Do U.S. Financial Regulators Listen to the Public? Testing the Regulatory Process with the RegRank Algorithm (Robert H. Smith School Research Paper, 2014).
14. See, e.g., James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at
71; Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.
J. 1321 (2010).
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Together, these findings suggest that we cannot infer from the existing
evidence that businesses have captured the federal rulemaking process—that
it serves primarily to benefit their interests at the expense of the general public. This conclusion in turn insulates the regulatory system against two prominent concerns associated with the regulatory capture view of the rulemaking
process: that the regulatory system fails to serve the public interest and that
it lacks democratic legitimacy.
First, the conclusion that the regulatory capture view of the rulemaking
process is unwarranted suggests that our regulatory system may well still
serve the public interest. Although many people might reasonably be disturbed by the evidence that businesses exert disproportionate influence over
regulations, this evidence alone does not demonstrate that our regulatory system is primarily benefiting businesses at the expense of the general public.
For instance, Professors Daniel Carpenter and David Moss speculate that the
existing level of business influence is likely making our regulatory system
worse than it otherwise would be, but they speculate that we are still better
off with the system we have than we would be without any regulation. 15 Several scholars have gone further, arguing that greater business influence can
in some circumstances lead to better regulatory outcomes overall, for example, by encouraging businesses to provide agencies with better information
or by creating a powerful political constituency for new regulations. 16
Second, this conclusion also helps to insulate the regulatory system
against the concern that rulemaking lacks democratic legitimacy. Agency
rules’ legitimacy derives not only from Congress’s passage of their authorizing legislation, but also from the public’s effective participation in the administrative process. 17 By the same token, the perceptions that the public has
been prevented from participating in regulatory decisions, or that such participation is ineffectual, serve to undermine agency rules’ legitimacy. 18 To
15. Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 11–12.
16. See, e.g., Laurence Tai, Harnessing Industry Influence, 68 ADMIN L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing we should aim to encourage—rather than discourage—industry influence over regulations in
order to incentivize industry to provide more information to agencies); David Thaw, Enlightened
Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329 (2014) (examining a case where regulatory capture by
an advisory committee comprising private interests advanced public goals); Matthew Wansley, Virtuous Capture, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 419 (2015) (arguing there are some cases in which regulatory
capture serves to advance the public interest).
17. See, e.g., KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 168 (“The legitimacy of the rulemaking
process is clearly linked to public participation.”); Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 354 (“The
legitimacy of rules is derived from two sources, with the first being the authorizing statutes noted
above. The second source of legitimacy is the process by which unelected officials develop the
rules. . . . [T]he most important procedural element is the central, indeed indispensable, role of public participation in the development of rules. Public participation serves, in effect, as a substitute
for the electoral process that bestows constitutional legitimacy on legislation.”).
18. Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical and
Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV 611, 615
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the extent that businesses do in fact control regulations, agency rulemaking
would appear to lack legitimacy; yet to the extent that businesses do not exert
such control, this source of legitimacy would seem to remain intact.
In addition, this conclusion has important implications for how to improve the regulatory process to limit excessive interest group influence. If it
were in fact the case that businesses primarily controlled the regulatory process, then that might warrant deregulating or radically restructuring our regulatory regime. 19 Of course, even if business interests do not control the rulemaking process, one may still reasonably be concerned that they have too
many advantages relative to other interest groups and individuals and that
reforms are necessary to level the playing field. 20 But such a conclusion
would seem to justify more incremental reforms, rather than radically restructuring the process by which agencies issue rules.
Part I will describe the theory of regulatory capture and how this theory
has evolved, review the empirical literature on interest group participation
and influence in the rulemaking process, and explore what questions still remain unanswered. Part II will describe the Tank Car Rule and the case study
methodology, and explore several limitations of interest group influence on
the formulation of this rule. Part III will examine the implications for the
utility of the regulatory system, for its democratic legitimacy, and for regulatory reform.
All this is not to deny that there are problems with the federal regulatory
system or that businesses wield important influence in the development of
regulations. One important caveat is that while this study focuses only on
business interests’ direct participation and influence in the rulemaking process, businesses have numerous other tools at their disposal to influence regulatory policy. For example, “[b]usiness interests can persuade members of
(2013) (“[W]idespread antipathy towards administrative agencies may also reflect a sense that the
public has been foreclosed from making decisions regarding the proper allocation of resources, decisions that instead are made by relatively insulated bureaucrats remote from mechanisms of democratic accountability and unaware of citizens’ preferences.” (footnote omitted)); Carpenter &
Moss, supra note 4, at 5 (“Public trust in the Federal government has slid ever lower over the last
forty years and as of this writing, stands at under 20%. To the extent that assumptions about regulatory capture contribute to such fatalism, it is incumbent on us to move beyond simplified theories
and carefully explore special interest influence with a closer eye on practice.”).
19. Judge Richard Posner implies that such a prescription may have been warranted in the late
1970s, when industry-specific regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Civil Aeronautics Board were deregulated. Richard Posner, The Concept of Regulatory
Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO
LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 75; see also Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 5 (“All too frequently,
moreover, casual claims of capture are associated with demands that the regulatory policy or agency
in question be not merely reformed but abandoned.”).
20. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 18, at 627–28 (arguing that more balanced participation in the
rulemaking process will result in agencies receiving more accurate information and a “sense of
investedness on the part of public participants”).
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Congress to pressure agencies not to regulate or adopt weak regulations, and
can influence the White House to appoint administrators hostile to an
agency’s mission.” 21 Business interests may also wield influence through the
“revolving door” between regulated industries and government positions. 22
There are numerous examples of business interests using these tools to their
own advantage. 23
Yet by painting an exaggerated portrait of these problems, the capture
account risks further undermining public trust in government and leading to
unnecessary or unwise regulatory reforms, some of which could even augment business influence in the regulatory process. In a legal system that relies on regulations as a principal source for ordering business activity, understanding the nature and extent of business influence is essential to deciding
whether—and how—to reform the regulatory system.
I. THEORIES AND EVIDENCE OF INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
A. Regulatory Capture and Its Progeny
The modern literature on interest group influence in the administrative
rulemaking process has been shaped by, and to a large extent reflects, the
theory of regulatory capture. 24 The scholarly literature on regulatory capture
dates back to the early 1950s (and its intellectual antecedents go back much
further), 25 but it gained prominence with the ascendance of the Chicago
school of economics, and in particular with George Stigler’s influential 1971
essay, The Theory of Economic Regulation. 26 In his essay, Stigler famously

21. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 226 (2012); see also Wendy E. Wagner, Holding
Tight to the Reigns in Harnessing Industry Influence: A Comment on Professor Laurence Tai, 2
ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 1, 8 (2016) (“[I]n regulatory practice, there are other venues for altering
regulatory outcomes; informing the agency is only one of them.”).
22. Rafael Gely & Asghar Zardkoohi, Measuring the Effects of Post-Government-Employment
Restrictions, 3 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 288, 300 (2001).
23. Jesse Drucker & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Trump Administration is Relaxing Oversight of
Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/business/trump-administration-nursing-homes.html (outlining how the Trump Administration has
weakened nursing home regulations following “intense lobbying by the nursing home industry”).
24. Bull, supra note 18, at 627–28 (“[T]he process is often skewed to favor more organized
interests that can marshal the resources to lobby the agencies more effectively.” (first citing George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971), then citing
John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725–
26 (1986))).
25. William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at
28.
26. Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Capturing Regulatory Reality: Stigler’s The Theory of Economic Regulation 1 (Penn Law Faculty Scholarship Paper 1650, 2016).
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posited that regulation is a product subject to the laws of supply and demand,
and that as a result of these market forces, “as a rule, regulation is acquired
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” 27
Unlike previous theories, which largely assumed that regulators try to
act in the interest of the general public, the standard version of the “capture”
account assumes that regulators act in their own material self-interest. 28 At
the same time, concentrated interests such as businesses are in a better position than other interest groups to advance their own interests through the regulatory process because they have more at stake in most regulatory issues and
are well-organized; by contrast, groups that aim to promote the general public’s interests are less influential because the individuals they represent usually have less at stake and are harder to organize. 29 In combination, these
two factors are supposed to explain how businesses control the regulatory
process. 30
In the capture account, businesses may exert influence through several
potential channels. Initially, capture theorists proposed that capture operated
through an “iron triangle,” in which industries lobbied Congress to exert pressure on agencies through legislation or oversight. 31 Subsequent scholarship
explored other means by which industry may motivate regulators to act in its
interest: such as offering explicit “quid pro quo” arrangements or creating
more tacit incentives such as the possibility of future employment in the regulated industry. 32

27. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3, 3
(1971).
28. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 8, at 169 (“Opposing the ‘public interest’ theory is the
‘capture,’ or ‘special interest’ theory (also known as the ‘economic,’ or ‘government services’ theory) of regulatory behavior, which describes actors in the regulatory process as having narrow, selfinterested goals––principally job retention or the pursuit of reelection, self-gratification from the
exercise of power, or perhaps postofficeholding personal wealth.” (footnote omitted)).
29. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); Stigler, supra note 27.
30. Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School) [hereinafter Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley], https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/08-03-10%20Bagley%20Testimony.pdf.
31. Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 2–3; see also Nicholas Bagley &
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–
85 (2006); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1343 (2012).
32. Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 3–4; see also Ernesto Dal Bó,
Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 211–212 (2006); Kwak, supra
note 14, at 75.
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Although the capture theory of regulation has proven enormously influential, in recent years it has been criticized on a number of different grounds,
including that it offers a highly unrealistic description of how most regulatory
agencies operate, 33 its empirical underpinnings are flimsy, 34 and it is impossible to empirically prove or disprove. 35 In perhaps the most comprehensive
rebuttal of this account, Professor Steven Croley argues that administrative
procedures serve to bolster agencies’ autonomy, insulate them against interest group influence, and level the playing field for less well-resourced interest
groups to compete with better-resourced ones. 36 Croley notes, for example,
that interest groups use information, rather than votes or the promise of campaign contributions, to lobby agency regulators; agencies’ decision-making
processes are more open than those of legislative committees; agency personnel have job security which insulates them from political pressure; and
the threat of judicial review levels the playing field by forcing regulators to
give adequate consideration to all the perspectives on the rule. 37 To bolster
his thesis, Croley presents case studies of several important regulatory initiatives in which federal agencies appeared to advance the interests of the general public in the face of organized industry opposition. 38
More recent scholarship has re-conceptualized capture in ways that address some of these criticisms. Most notably, these theories articulate new
possible mechanisms for capture that do not depend upon the assumption that

33. See, e.g., Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 4 (“Although agency
capture offers a compelling story about how some agencies operate some of the time, it is also a
crude stereotype about agency behavior. Some agencies succumb to industry group pressure, but
most resist it admirably.” (footnote omitted)).
34. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 305–06 (2008) (“The public choice account of regulation is idea rich,
but evidence poor. It is easy to state, difficult to disprove, and resonates with deep-rooted and
indeed often well-founded negative visions of politicians and politics. But its empirical record,
charitably tabulated, does not vindicate its deregulatory policy prescriptions. Some regulation has
undermined social welfare; much important regulation has not.”); Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and
Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND
HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 4, at 57. (“In short, the evidentiary standards of the capture literature
are rather low . . . .”); Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 26, at 1 (“[I]ts empirical evidence failed
to rule out competing explanations, including the very possibility of the public interest theory that
he sought to challenge.”).
35. See Written Statement of Nicholas Bagley, supra note 30, at 5 (“The central problem with
agency capture is that it is neither easily identifiable nor readily falsifiable.”).
36. CROLEY, supra note 34, at 73–74; see also Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, DoddFrank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 15
(2013),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dodd-frank-regulators-cost-benefit-analysisand-agency-capture/ (arguing that cost-benefit analysis and notice-and-comment rulemaking together “should substantially disarm the threat of agency capture”).
37. CROLEY, supra note 34, at 135–42.
38. Id. at 157–212.
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regulators always act in their own material self-interest. 39 For example, Professor James Kwak explores how cultural factors, such as regulators’ identities, social status, and relationships can cause even well-intentioned regulators to inadvertently favor the regulated industry. 40 Contra to Croley,
Professor Wendy Wagner shows that the structures of administrative law empower interest groups to capture regulators by inundating them with complex
information. 41 For example, she documents how the rise of the “hard look”
review doctrine, in which courts closely scrutinize agencies’ rulemakings to
ensure that the agencies have adequately responded to all material comments,
encourages interest groups to submit “highly specific, very detailed, [and]
extensively documented comments on every conceivable point of contention,
and to back up their comments with the threat of litigation.” 42
Yet unlike in traditional capture theory, which asserts that regulators “as
a rule” will advance the interests of the regulated industry, these newer variants of capture do not necessarily imply that industry is always able to shape
regulatory policy to achieve its desired ends. 43 Kwak emphasizes that cultural capture is not necessarily controlling and does not preclude the possibility that public-interested regulators will overcome these challenges to act
in the general public’s interest. 44 Wagner argues that information capture
“allows some parties to control or at least dominate regulatory outcomes using information.” 45 In a similar vein, Professor Ganesh Sitaraman writes that
regulatory capture “does not mean that regulations in the public interest are
never possible but only that, when looked at in the aggregate, the system leans
in a direction that tends to help powerful special interests rather than the public interest.” 46

39. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 14, at 1392 (noting that “[c]ommitted EPA staff is likely to
be an extremely important force in pushing back against unilateral pressure from one group, particularly industry”).
40. Kwak, supra note 14, at 80.
41. Wagner, supra note 14, at 1328 (arguing that “variety of doctrinal and statutory incentives
unwittingly encourage regulatory participants to load the administrative system with more and more
information in ways that ultimately undermine pluralistic oversight by creating unfair advantages
for those advocates who have the resources to engage in these excessive processes”).
42. Id. at 1362–63.
43. Professors Christopher Carrigan and Cary Coglianese point out that Stigler himself “did
not believe that all regulation is acquired by industry . . . [though] he did seem to think that a lot of
regulation came into existence solely to serve industry’s interests.” Carrigan & Coglianese, supra
note 26, at 6 (emphasis added).
44. Kwak, supra note 14, at 79, 94.
45. Wagner, supra note 14, at 1328 (emphasis added).
46. GANESH SITARAMAN, REFORMING REGULATION POLICIES TO COUNTERACT CAPTURE
AND IMPROVE THE REGULATORY PROCESS 2 (2016).
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Although these newer variants of capture avoid some of the unrealistic
assumptions of traditional capture theory, their implications as to the magnitude of business influence are less clear. These theories provide compelling
reasons to think that agencies are biased in favor of business, but they offer
less guidance as to what extent businesses actually control regulations.
Whether businesses in practice succeed in controlling the rulemaking process
is, therefore, an empirical question.
B. The Empirical Literature
Like the theoretical literature on regulatory capture, the empirical literature on interest group influence in the rulemaking process by and large supports the notion that businesses play an outsized role in the regulatory process, relative to other types of interest groups. Yet also like the theoretical
literature, the empirical literature does not yield definitive conclusions as to
the magnitude of this influence—the extent to which interest groups are able
to achieve their desired policy outcomes. 47 This literature focuses on a few
main questions: Who participates in the rulemaking process? How much influence do they exert over regulatory outcomes? And what are the determinants of influence in the rulemaking process?
1. Participation and Participants
There are several stages of the rulemaking process and multiple formal
opportunities for individuals and organizations to participate. The “best
known and indeed archetypal” of these is the notice-and-comment process. 48
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), federal agencies are required to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) in the Federal
Register and provide the public an opportunity to comment before they issue
a final rule (subject to certain exceptions). 49 Agencies must then “process
and then respond to, all significant comments.” 50 In some cases, before an
agency has issued a proposed rule, it may choose to issue a preliminary document called an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) to
“[announce] that [the] agency is considering a regulatory action . . . before it
develops a detailed proposed rule.” 51 If an agency chooses to issue an
47. This agnosticism aligns with that expressed by Professors Wendy Wagner, Katherine
Barnes, and Lisa Peters in their 2011 study. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 152 (“Ultimately, even if interest group participation . . . is badly skewed, and even if this leads to rule
changes that favor the dominant group, it is not clear what the substantive implications of this imbalance might be.”).
48. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 362.
49. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
50. Wagner, supra note 14, at 1354 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
51. Regulatory Information Service Center, Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions—Fall 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,496, 94,500 (Dec. 23, 2016).
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ANPRM, then the public is given an opportunity to comment on that document as well. 52
Most empirical studies of participation in the notice-and-comment process find that businesses participate with greater frequency and intensity than
public interest groups and members of the public, though public interest
groups usually have at least some representation. One early study is the U.S.
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs’s 1977 report, Public Participation in Regulatory Agency Proceedings. The Senate Committee asks a number of different agencies to identify the ten most significant of each agency’s
last thirty rulemakings and adjudications and examine the regulatory dockets.
It finds that there was no public interest representation in more than half of
formal agency proceedings and almost none at informal proceedings. 53
Similarly, Professor Cary Coglianese examines interest group participation on the twenty-five significant rules that were issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) between 1989 and 1991 and finds that “industry groups
are by far the most active participants of all,” with businesses participating in
96% and industry associations participating in 80% of the rules he examined. 54 By contrast, other types of interest groups and individual members of
the public have much lower levels of participation. For instance, state governments participated in only 52% of the rules, national environmental
groups participated in only 44%, and individuals participated in only 40%. 55
Nearly 60% of the participants were business interests, and only 4% were
from the environmental community. 56
Subsequent studies largely corroborate these findings, though with
some exceptions. 57 Professor Marissa Golden examines eleven federal rules
at the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), and Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”). Two of the regulatory agencies (EPA and NHTSA)

52. Id.
53. See COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY
AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, S. DOC. NO. 95-71, at vii (1977).
54. Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative
Process 1, 70–71, 75 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with
author).
55. Id. at 73.
56. Id. at 70–71.
57. Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture, supra note 13, at 323 (conducting a content analysis of thirty-six rules from the DOT and finding that while businesses often participate at a high
rate, this is not consistent across rulemakings). High-salience rules appear to receive especially
large numbers of comments from individual members of the public. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra
note 54, at 65 (“Rules of broad, foundational policy importance tend to attract large numbers of
public comments.”).
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have extremely limited participation by public interest groups and individuals, and there is little citizen participation in any of the rules. 58 Professors
Jason and Susan Webb Yackee analyze over thirty rules and around 1700
public comments from four U.S. federal agencies and find that business interests submitted over 57% of the comments in their data set. 59 Professors
Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters examine ninety Hazardous Air Pollutant rules and find that comments from business interests comprise over 81% of the comments. 60 Professors Scott Furlong and Cornelius
Kerwin conduct a survey of interest groups and find that businesses participate in over twice as many rulemakings as public interest groups. 61 By contrast, Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar examines democratic participation
in three different rulemakings issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
the Federal Election Commission, and the Treasury Department, and finds
that even when form letters are excluded, “comments from individual members of the lay public account for over 70% of comments” in two of the three
regulations he examines. 62
The notice-and-comment process is not, however, the only—or the most
important—opportunity for the public to participate in the rulemaking process. One crucial but “seldom studied” phase of the rulemaking process is
the agenda-setting phase: the phase at which regulators decide to initiate a
rulemaking process on a particular subject. 63 The APA provides that “[e]ach
agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.” 64 Agencies must respond to these petitions,
and if they deny them, provide reasons for their decisions, 65 though judicial
review of an agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition is typically “highly
deferential.” 66 Participating at this early stage of the rulemaking process—
either through submitting a petition for rulemaking or communicating

58. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 253, 255 (1998).
59. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 131–33.
60. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 128–29.
61. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 361.
62. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,
429, 460 (2005).
63. Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and
Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV 93, 94, 97 (2016) (treating agenda-setting “in a relatively open-ended,
broad fashion so as to include all the choices and opportunities that both agency officials and other
participants in the regulatory process have about what problems agencies emphasize and what alternatives they consider”).
64. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
65. Id. § 555(b).
66. Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93,
96–97 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1382.
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through informal channels—is thought to be a more effective means of influencing a rule than participating in the public comment process, since the rule
must be very close to fully developed by the time it is proposed. 67
The empirical research that focuses on this stage of the rulemaking process concludes that business interests participate more than other types of
interest groups. Professor Kimberly Krawiec takes advantage of special
transparency requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act to analyze interest group
participation in the early development the Volcker Rule. 68 From analyzing
thousands of public comments submitted in advance of the issuance of the
Volcker Rule NPRM and the logs of hundreds of meetings with agency officials, Krawiec concludes that the “battleground is dominated by regulated
industry.” 69 In a review of 276 rules, Professor William West and Connor
Raso find that 60% of the rules in their sample were issued at the agencies’
discretion and business groups disproportionately participated in the agendasetting process for these discretionary rules. 70 Indeed, they find only five
discretionary rules in which public interest groups were involved at the
agenda-setting phase, suggesting that “participation in agenda setting may be
significantly more one-sided” than participation in the public comment process. 71
Some evidence suggests public interest groups may play a more active
role in nondiscretionary rules, particularly those issued pursuant to a court
order. Coglianese finds that environmental groups file most of the deadline
suits brought against the EPA (lawsuits brought to compel an agency to issue
a rule in response to a congressionally-imposed deadline). 72 Professor
Wendy Wagner, Professor Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters find that sixtysix (73%) of the Hazardous Air Pollutants rules in their sample were promulgated under court orders from deadline suits filed in the United States
67. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 200 (describing two studies which find that “business interests participate more actively and effectively during the important early stage of rule development”); E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L. J. 1490, 1495 (1992) (“Because of the need to create a record, real public participation—the kind of back and forth dialogue
in which minds (and rules) are really changed—primarily takes place in various fora well in advance
of a notice of proposed rulemaking appearing in the Federal Register.”); Wagner, Barnes, & Peters,
supra note 13, at 110 (“Ironically . . . the emphasis on developing a proposed rule that is ready for
comment pushes a great deal of the policymaking and true regulatory work earlier in the process,
during the rule development stage. Indeed, the courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is
to survive judicial review, it must be essentially in final form at the proposed rule stage.”).
68. Kimberly Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 53 (2013).
69. See id. at 84.
70. West & Raso, supra note 13, at 495, 504.
71. Id. at 510. But see COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, S. Doc. No. 95-71, at 14–15 (1977) (finding that at two
agencies, public interest groups filed as many or more petitions for rulemaking then businesses).
72. Coglianese, supra note 54, at 42.
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Courts of Appeals, and they assume that these cases are predominantly
brought by public interest groups. 73
Another important stage of the rulemaking process at which interest
groups may participate is the OIRA review process. Under Executive Order
12,866, federal agencies are required to submit all “significant regulatory action[s]” to OIRA for review before they can become final. 74 Perhaps the most
well-known part of this review process involves reviewing the costs and benefits of new rules. 75 Once the agency formally submits a rule to OIRA for
review, interest groups and members of the public are given an opportunity
to meet with OIRA to express their views on the rule. 76 OIRA’s policy in
recent years has also been “to meet with any party interested in discussing
issues on a rule under review.” 77
Once again, most evidence finds that businesses participate more intensely at this phase of the rulemaking process. 78 Croley examines all OIRA
meetings from 1993 to 2000 and finds that 56% of the meetings included only
businesses and trade associations, 28% included business interests and public
interest organizations, 10% were attended only by public interest organizations, and 5% were attended only by governmental groups. 79 Professor Rena
Steinzor, Michael Patoka, and James Goodwin examine interest group participation in 6194 OIRA reviews between 2001 and 2011, and find that 65%
of the attendees at these meetings represented industry—around five times as
many people who represented public interest groups. 80
Interest group participation in the rulemaking process does not end
when a final rule is issued. For instance, different kinds of interest groups
may resort to submitting administrative appeals or even filing for judicial review in the United States Courts of Appeals to vindicate their interests. 81 As

73. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 137.
74. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
75. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1370 (“At the heart of OIRA’s review of agency
decision making is the cost-benefit standard, which requires, to the extent possible, that agencies
identify and quantify the benefits and costs of proposed rulemakings.”).
76. 3 C.F.R. 638.
77. Regulations and the Rulemaking Process, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.myjsp#reg_rule (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
78. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1306 (“Predictably, then—and despite OIRA’s location
within the Executive Office of the President—the available evidence supports the view that the mix
of participants active in the OIRA review process heavily favors industry.”).
79. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 857–58 (2003).
80. RENA STEINZOR, MICHAEL PATOKA, & JAMES GOODWIN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT
THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMP PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER SAFETY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3, 5, 8 (2011); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White
House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 263 (2012).
81. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).
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Coglianese points out, ex ante there are some reasons to suggest that businesses might file more litigation over rules, but there are other countervailing
reasons to suggest that public interest groups may file more litigation. On
the one hand, business interests tend to have greater incentives and resources;
on the other hand, litigation tends to be an “outside” strategy, pursued by
groups who are excluded from the political process. 82
Yet here too, the empirical evidence that exists suggests that business
interests participate more intensely at this stage of the rulemaking process.
In his own study, Coglianese reports that in 908 cases filed against the EPA
from 1987 to 1991 most of the “lead plaintiffs” were corporations or trade
associations. 83 More recently, Wagner, Barnes, and Peters find that of the
twenty rules in their study that were the subjects of petitions for reconsideration or suits for judicial review, business interests filed nine of these petitions, public interest groups filed four, and both groups jointly filed seven. 84
Thus, with some exceptions, the empirical literature by and large supports the notion that businesses disproportionately participate throughout
every stage of the rulemaking process, though public interest groups usually
have some representation at most stages. This is further substantiated by a
survey of interest groups conducted by Furlong and Kerwin, which finds that
85% of the trade associations and businesses report participating in the rulemaking process, compared to about 75% of public interest groups. 85
2. Influence
Imbalances in interest group participation in administrative rulemaking
do not necessarily translate into imbalances in influence, however, and the
empirical evidence on interest group influence in the rulemaking process is
more equivocal. 86 Several early studies find participation in the public comment process generally did not have much influence over the content of
rules. 87 Professor Wesley Magat, Alan Krupnick, & Winston Harrington find

82. Coglianese, supra note 5455, at 69.
83. Id. at 100.
84. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 135.
85. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 359–60.
86. See CROLEY, supra note 34, at 127 (“But estimates of the frequency with which various
parties participate in agency decisionmaking processes and the amount of resources those parties
commit to their participation are meaningful only inasmuch as they provide reliable markers of
parties’ abilities to affect the substance of agency decisions. Ultimately, it is efficacious participation, not mere participation, that affects regulatory outcomes. Measurements of participation quantify the efforts different types of interests make to influence agency decisionmakers, but whether
those efforts spell proportionately more influence is a separate question.”).
87. For example, Professor E. Donald Elliott famously described the notice-and-comment process as Kabuki theater and claimed that it is “primarily a method for compiling a record for judicial
review.” Elliott, supra note 67, at 1492.
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that active participation by businesses during the notice-and-comment process generally did not translate into weaker regulations. 88 Professors David
C. Nixon, Robert M. Howard, and Jeff R. DeWitt examine a sample of
twenty-one rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
they hypothesize “represents the classic profile for the agency capture thesis.” 89 Focusing on references to comments in the preamble of the final rule,
they find that there is “practically no evidence” that more institutionally advantaged commenters (such as industry groups or self-regulatory organizations) are more likely to have their policy concerns addressed in notice-andcomment process. 90 More recently, Professor Susan Webb Yackee examines
thirty-six rules from the DOT issued between 2002 and 2005 and finds that
“businesses are not consistently influential.” 91
Other research finds that comments do result in cosmetic changes to the
rule but that these changes are not very consequential. Golden finds that “in
the majority of cases the agency made some of the changes that were requested by commenters, but it rarely altered the heart of the proposal.” 92 Professor Stuart Shapiro examines twelve economically significant regulations
issued between 2008 and 2010, and finds that agencies agreed with the commenters on 42% of the issues raised, but that agencies were more likely to
change regulations when the requested changes were minor clarifications rather than substantive changes to policy. 93 Professor William West examines
the notice-and-comment process in a sample of forty-two rules and finds that
twenty-eight of the rules involved significant conflict, and sixteen of those
rules changed. 94 However, he concludes that changes during the notice-andcomment process “are difficult, they are often confined to excision as a path
of least resistance, and they seldom address the fundamental nature of the
policy.” 95 Furlong and Kerwin conduct a survey of interest groups and find
that they do perceive written comments as being effective but that they “may

88. WESLEY MAGAT, ALAN KRUPNICK, & WINSTON HARRINGTON, RULES IN THE MAKING:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 143–45 (1986).
89. David C. Nixon, Robert M. Howard & Jeff R. DeWitt, With Friends Like These: RuleMaking Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 59, 61 (2002).
90. Id. at 74.
91. Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture, supra note 13, at 320.
92. Golden, supra note 58, at 259.
93. Stuart Shapiro, When Will They Listen? Public Comment and Highly Salient Regulations
10–13 (Mercatus Ctr. George Mason Univ. Working Paper No. 13–15, 2013).
94. William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66,
71 (2004).
95. Id. at 74.
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not necessarily see written comment as effective relative to other techniques.” 96
Several other recent studies, however, have found that interest groups’
participation in the public comment process—and business participation in
particular—does influence rules. Using content analysis to study over thirty
rules and over 1700 public comments from four federal agencies, Yackee and
Yackee find that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters,
hold important influence over the content of final rules—as measured by
whether the rule becomes more or less stringent overall from the proposed
rule stage to the final rule stage. 97 Susan Webb Yackee examines a selection
of forty rules promulgated by four federal agencies and finds that the agencies
often adapt the rule during the notice-and-comment period to better match
the position of participating interest groups. 98 Wagner, Barnes, and Peters
find a rough correlation of one change in the NPRM for every two issues
raised by commenters, and they find that the number of changes weakening
the rule increased with the number of comments from industry. 99
In the largest-scale study of its kind, Professors Andrei Kirilenko,
Shawn Mankad, and George Michailidis employ a machine-learning algorithm to examine 60,000 comments, 104 proposed rules, and 67 final rules
issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission between 2010 and
2013. 100 Kirilenko, Mankad, and Michailidis find that only those from the
regulated industry have an impact on the content of the final rule, but they
find that greater consensus among public comments, along with comments
from certain types of organizations, increases the chances of a rule being finalized. 101
A few studies have found evidence of interest group influence in the
regulatory process at other stages of the rulemaking process. Keith Naughton, Celeste Schmid, Susan Webb Yackee and Xueyong Zhan use content
analysis to study how a sample of thirty-six DOT rules change from the
ANPRM stage to the NPRM stage, and they find that these comments are
associated with changes in the content of the rule and whether the rule is
withdrawn. 102 Professors David Nelson and Susan Webb Yackee examine a
sample of rules from the DOT and find that lobbying coalitions influence the

96. Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 7, at 365.
97. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 133–35.
98. Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group
Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103 (2006).
99. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 130-131.
100. Kirilenko, Mankad & Michailidis supra note 13, at 3.
101. Id. at 4.
102. Keith Naughton et al., Understanding Commenter Influence During Agency Rule Development, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 (2009).
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development of rules from the ANPRM stage to the NPRM stage.103 Susan
Webb Yackee also finds that ex parte contacts do influence regulatory outputs and that they are a “potential factor in causing the withdrawal of regulations from consideration.” 104 Professors Simon F. Haeder and Susan Webb
Yackee study 1526 “economically significant” regulations that were reviewed by OIRA between 2005 and 2011 and find that lobbying by business
interests is associated with regulatory change, but that the same is not true
for public interest groups. 105 Daniel E. Walters analyzes data on rulemaking
petitions and finds that although business interests—when examined together—had a greater chance of having a petition granted than non-business
interests, this advantage disappears when business interests are disaggregated. 106 He finds that while the identity of the petitioner “does not seem to
drive agency decision-making with regard to rulemaking petitions . . . agencies favor rulemaking petitions that request narrow, technical changes in a
deregulatory direction.” 107
3. Determinants of Influence
There are two primary hypotheses regarding the conditions under which
interest groups are most likely to influence rules. First, perhaps the most
well-established hypothesis is that influence is determined by the size of a
group and the consensus among its participants. Nelson and Yackee theorize
that coalition size and consensus determine influence because they send a
signal to policymakers regarding the magnitude of strength or opposition for
a particular policy proposal and because coalition leaders are strategic about

103. David Nelson & Susan Webb Yackee, Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy
Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking, 74 J. POL. 339 (2012).
104. Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying, supra note 13, at 374.
105. Haeder & Yackee, supra note 13, at 1, 6; see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1307
(“Drawing firm conclusions about influence from participation rates is tricky, but GAO’s data are
suggestive: Of the twenty-five rules that OIRA ‘significantly affected’ in 2002, outside parties commented on eleven of them—and for seven of those eleven rules, ‘at least some of the actions that
OIRA recommended were similar to those suggested’ by the industry groups.” (footnote omitted)
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCY RULES AND
THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003))). But see Croley, supra note 79, at 859–61 (finding that interest group representation in OIRA meetings was not correlated with the probability of
rule change during the review process); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at 1358–59 (concluding that “[t]he imbalance in the number of meetings . . . says less about OIRA’s preferred meeting
partners than the relative ability to participate in the process of industry compared to protectionoriented groups.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1860–63 (2013) (arguing that the importance of 12866 meetings
has been “greatly exaggerated” and that “the sheer number of meetings, and the identity of those
who ask for meetings, say very little about the nature of the OIRA process”).
106. Daniel E. Walters, Capturing the Regulatory Agenda: An Empirical Study of Agency Responsiveness to Rulemaking Petitions, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 213 (2019)
107. Id. at 214.
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whom they recruit into their coalitions. 108 Similarly, Kerwin and Furlong
observe that “[p]ublic comments help agencies determine the degrees of acceptance and resistance in the affected communities to the rule under development.” 109 They suggest that this information may help agency officials
figure out what kinds of monitoring and enforcement systems they will need
to implement, as well as gauge the likelihood of future litigation.110
There are a number of empirical studies that support the hypothesis that
more unified interest groups have more influence in the rulemaking process. 111 Yackee and Yackee find “[w]hen business commenters are united in
their desire to see less regulation in a final rule . . . they will receive less regulation over 90% of the time,” 112 though they caution that their findings may
not be applicable to high-salience rulemakings, in which other types of interest groups are more likely to participate. 113
The second theory is that more sophisticated participants are more likely
to influence regulatory outcomes. Cuéllar suggests a few reasons why this
may be the case: Agency staff have limited resources so will be more responsive to comments that they can easily understand how to address; agency staff
may believe that the issues raised in more sophisticated comments are more
likely to be scrutinized in judicial review; and more sophisticated commenters may know “how to make recommendations that fall within the staff’s
purview, thus gaining a chance to persuade the staff about how to use its
discretion.” 114

108. Nelson & Yackee, supra note 103, at 342–43.
109. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 169.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 58, at 259 (finding that agencies are most likely to modify
their NPRMs when there is consensus among commenters); Haeder & Yackee, supra note 13, at 1
(finding that both the number of interest groups and the consensus among them are positively associated with a change in the rule, though these results hold only for industry and not public interest
groups); Amy McKay & Susan Webb Yackee, Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency
Rules, 35 AM. POL. RES. 336 (2007) (finding that an interest group’s dominance in the public comment process translates to influence on the rule); Stuart Shapiro, Does the Amount of Participation
Matter? Public Comments, Agency Responses and the Time to Finalize a Regulation, 41 POL. SCI.
33 (2008) (finding that agencies make changes to the their proposed rule when they receive a lot of
comments on highly complex rules that are not politically salient but that high comment volume did
not lead to changes from the proposed rule on high-salience or low-complexity rules); Yackee &
Yackee, supra note 13, at 128 (finding that businesses are more influential when more businesses
and fewer non-businesses participate). But see Nixon, et al., supra note 89, at 59 (finding little
evidence that the number or proportion of commenters in favor of a specific request determines the
likelihood that that request will be reflected in the final rule); Susan Webb Yackee, Assessing InterInstitutional Attention to and Influence on Government Regulations, 36 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 723,
740 (2006) (finding no evidence that increased consensus among interest groups as to whether the
rule should become more or less stringent enhances influence).
112. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 135.
113. Id. at 137.
114. Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 482–85.
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There is some—albeit more limited—evidence to support this hypothesis. Drawing on interviews with agency officials involved in drafting rules,
Cuéllar develops a series of questions designed to measure the sophistication
of public comment letters, and he finds some “initial evidence” to support
this hypothesis. 115 Other research finds that businesses and industry associations tend to submit much more sophisticated comments than individual
members of the public. 116 Steven Rashin analyzes 47,000 comments to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and finds that organizations that submit comments that include data and industry-specific language are more
likely to result in modifications to proposed rules.117
Both of these theories of influence have been invoked to support the
hypothesis that businesses are more influential in the rulemaking process than
other kinds of interest groups. Because of businesses’ superior resources and
organizational capacity, they are better equipped than other kinds of interest
groups and members of the public both to build large coalitions and to participate in more rulemakings. 118 In addition, Yackee and Yackee suggest that
business interests are more uniform than the interests of other types of interest

115. Id. at 476. Cuéllar’s sophistication scale relies on five questions: (1) “Did the commenter
distinguish the regulation from the statutory requirements?”; (2) “Did the commenter . . . indicat[e]
an understanding of . . . the statutory requirement?”; (3) “Did the commenter propose an explicit
change in the regulation provided in the notice of proposed rulemaking . . . ?”; (4) “Did the commenter provide at least one example or discrete logical argument for why the commenter’s concern
should be addressed?”; and (5) “Did the commenter provide any legal, policy, or empirical background information to place the suggestions in context?” Id. at 431. But see Yackee & Yackee,
supra note 13, at 136 (applying their own measure of comment quality, and finding no evidence
that businesses submit higher-quality comments, despite having more influence in the notice-andcomment process).
116. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE
L. J. 943, 959 (2006) (“According to one recent study of about 500,000 comments submitted on an
especially controversial EPA rule, less than 1[%] of these comments reportedly had anything original to say.” (citing David Schlosberg et al., “To Submit a Form or Not to Submit a Form, That Is
the (Real) Question”: Deliberation and Mass Participation in U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking II (May
5, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal))); Krawiec, supra note 68,
at 77–78 (“[I]mportantly, the citizen letters provide . . . little evidence that commenters even understand, or care, what proprietary trading or fund investment is, much less the ways in which the
Volcker Rule might govern such activities. The contrast with the meticulously drafted, argued, and
researched—though far less numerous—letters from financial industry members and trade groups
is stark.” (footnote omitted)).
117. Steven Rashin, Private Influence on the Regulatory Process: Evidence from Comments on
Rules
2,
4
(Mar.
25,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.dropbox.com/s/q2lz007jv4vt3hv/Rashin-Private-Influence-8-23.pdf?dl=0.
118. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 116 (“Finally, the notice-and-comment process itself may be ‘open’ to all, but in practice accessible to only a few, at least when rules are very
complex and technical. . . . While expert, sophisticated public interest groups may be able to penetrate these costly rules, even they will lack resources to engage in all of them and may find they
must dedicate resources to only a few.”).
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groups so it is easier for them to achieve consensus.119 Similarly, several
scholars have suggested that businesses may be more likely to have the capacity to provide richer and more sophisticated feedback on regulations that
includes analysis on technical, legal, or policy matters.120
4. Conclusions and Hypotheses
Although the empirical literature on interest group influence in the rulemaking process is not uniform in its results, it supports a few conclusions:
With some exceptions—perhaps particularly for high-salience rules and
deadline suits—businesses tend to participate to a greater extent at most
stages of the rulemaking process than public interest groups and individuals. 121 The findings on influence are more equivocal, but the recent literature
in particular supports the conclusion that business interests exert more influence than other interest groups during the regulatory process. 122 The determinants of this influence are still not well-understood, but there is evidence
that interest group influence is determined by the number of participants in a
group and the consensus among them (at least in low-salience rulemakings),
as well their relative sophistication. 123
Yet a careful review of this literature also raises several possible reasons
why business interests may have less influence over the rulemaking process
than this evidence alone suggests. Some of these reasons have to do with
constraints on businesses influence, while others involve methodological issues that may give the impression that businesses have more influence than
they really do.

119. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 130 (“Of course, not all business comments will be
unified in their suggestions for change and the degree of consensus in their messages should affect
the ability to persuade agencies. However, on average, we may expect more cohesion in matters of
regulatory policy between business interests than other groups of potential participants.”).
120. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 194 (“Data we have collected in our previous surveys suggest that businesses, and the trade associations that represent businesses and professions,
are involved in rulemaking more often than are other groups, and they devote to it greater slices of
their likely larger budgets and staffs. A strong case can be made that their superior resources and
experience lead to a degree of influence in rulemaking that others cannot match. But the data from
our surveys are not sufficient to establish such a case.”); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 131
(outlining several reasons why this might be the case).
121. See supra Section I.B.1.
122. See supra Section I.B.2.
123. See supra Section I.B.3.
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Hypothesis 1: Businesses may take very different positions on
regulatory issues, even when they are broadly in favor of less
regulation.
Although the empirical literature finds that business interests dominate
the rulemaking process, and that consensus among business interests is one
of the main determinants of whether they have influence in the rulemaking
process, some of this literature relies on a fairly coarse-grained definition of
consensus. This literature either treats interest groups as being in consensus
if they consistently are in favor of more or less stringent regulation overall or
if they support or oppose a rule. 124 Yet it is possible that business interests
are unified in these general respects, and yet still sharply disagree on important aspects of the rule. 125
Business interests may take very different positions on regulatory issues, depending on their industry, size, region, and other factors. 126 Such
inter-industry and inter-business conflicts can have the effect of hampering
business’s ability to obtain beneficial regulatory changes. 127 In fact, rather

124. See, e.g., Nelson & Yackee, supra note 103, at 347 (measuring “Rule Consensus by first
identifying the regulatory direction desired by each of the study’s respondents . . . [then comparing]
the desired direction of all coalition participants across each sample rule” (emphasis omitted)).
125. See David M. Hart, “Business” Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in
American National Politics, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 47 (2004) (arguing that interest group theory
does not provide an adequate framework for understanding businesses, and calling on political science researchers to devote more study to individual firms).
126. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 298–99 (2004) (“Older firms frequently have interests that
differ from newer firms. Suppliers’ interests can differ from those of manufacturers. Firms selling
to regional or niche markets may differ from firms selling to a broad, national market. Differences
in firms’ cost structures, technologies, and comparative abilities will affect attitudes toward disclosing information to regulators. Firms also differ in the degree to which they are regulated. Some
firms are affected by an entire series of regulations issued by a government agency, while other
firms are affected by only a few of the agency’s rules. Firms that interact with a regulatory agency
on an ongoing basis will have stronger interests in open and accurate disclosure of otherwise adverse
information on any given issue than firms that rarely interact with the agency; the former have more
need to maintain their credibility with the regulator.”).
127. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 211 (“There are examples of programs that are
seemingly dominated by what we would call business interests . . . . But, at the same time, a degree
of conflict between these two business interests effectively prevented either of them from dominating the process.”). For a recent high-profile example of this, see Patrick Radden Keefe, Carl Icahn’s
Failed Raid on Washington, NEW YORKER (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/28/carl-icahns-failed-raid-on-washington (describing how opposition from the ethanol industry helped to quash an attempt by Carl Icahn to convince the Trump Administration to
change an EPA regulation that would have benefited him). But see Krawiec, supra note 68, at 82
(finding in her study of interest group participation in the development of the Volcker Rule that
“financial industry interests appear . . . more unified in their interests than press reports and the
legislative history would predict, reducing the probability that conflict among powerful interest
groups will diminish the influence of any single position”).
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than always being opposed to stronger regulations, business interests sometimes join public interest groups in seeking stronger regulatory requirements. 128 These differing priorities provide more reason to be skeptical that
imbalances in participation between businesses and other types of interest
groups in the rulemaking process translate to equivalent differences in influence.
Business interests appear to be lobbying more at cross-purposes in recent years. In one study of business lobbying, Lee Drutman observes that
inter- and intra-industry competition has become more common as more
companies have begun hiring their own lobbyists and ceased relying as heavily on trade associations. 129 He observes that today, “[r]arely does ‘business’
lobby as a single unified entity. More and more, corporate lobbying involves
fights between industries and even between companies.” 130
Hypothesis 2: Businesses may often not receive their desired rule
changes, even when the stringency of the rule shifts in the direction
that they desire.
There are multiple ways to measure interest group influence in the rulemaking process, and it is not known whether these different measures yield
consistent results. For example, much of Susan Webb Yackee and her coauthors’ work measures influence at the rule level, coding whether each comment is in favor of more or less stringent regulation and then noting whether
the rule actually became more or less strict overall from the proposed to final
rule stage. 131 By comparison, Wagner, Barnes, and Peters examine the most
significant requests for changes to the rule (as enumerated by the agency in

128. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS,
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 12 (2009) (“Citizen groups, like others, typically participate in policy debates alongside other actors of many types who share the same goals. For every citizen group opposing an action by a given industrial group, for example, there may also be an ally coming from a
competing industry with which the group can join forces.”); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 31, at
1355 (describing the “Bootleggers and Baptists” coalition, in which public interest groups team up
with businesses to enact anti-competitive regulations); Shapiro, supra note 21, at 240 (“[N]ot all
business related comments seek the same ends. Some corporations (or trade associations) may find
it in their self-interest to support stronger regulation.”); West & Raso, supra note 13, at 508 (“Business interests do not always speak with a common voice. Characterizing rulemaking by the Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as ‘the politics of greed,’ for
example, an official from that agency’s Alaska region noted that the recreational fishing industry
(charter boats), large commercial fishermen, and small commercial fishermen often had conflicting
interests. Nor are the goals of business groups necessarily incompatible with those of less wellrepresented constituents. Requests from mortgage bankers for the Rural Housing Service (of the
US Department of Agriculture) to simplify its loan-application rules may also benefit the low-income families that agency was created to serve.”).
129. LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING 112–17 (2015).
130. Id. at 23.
131. See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 131–32.
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the preamble to the final rule), whether they asked for a stronger or weaker
regulatory requirement, and whether the specific changes they sought were
granted by the agency in the final rule how the agency responded to these
requests. 132 One alternative approach follows Cuéllar, who records the total
number of suggestions raised in each comment that were adopted by changes
in the rule, along with whether any suggestion in the comment was
adopted. 133
Golden observes, empirically measuring influence is “one of political
science’s thorniest problems.” 134 Each of these methodologies has its own
advantages and potential drawbacks. The first two measures make it more
feasible to analyze a larger number of comments and rules; yet they could
conceivably lead to overestimating influence, as there may be situations
where the stringency of the rule or one part of the rule shifts in the direction
that the commenter wanted but the agency rejects the specific changes that
the commenter requested. 135 By contrast, measuring influence by calculating
the proportion of specific policy concerns raised in the comments that are
adopted in the final rule, as Cuéllar does, would seem to obviate this problem.
Yet tracing out which specific concerns were adopted is likely more timeintensive, which makes it more difficult to analyze a large sample of rules
and comments, thus limiting the generalizability of the study. Furthermore,
whereas the previous methodologies may be over-inclusive, this measure
might understate interest group influence, as interest groups could still have
an impact on the development of the rule without receiving the specific
changes they requested. 136
132. Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 13, at 155.
133. Cuéllar treats a suggestion as being “adopted” when:
(a) the agency makes precisely the change requested by a comment, (b) the agency claims
in the Federal Register statement accompanying the final rule that a particular change
was made in response to concerns raised in comments like the one in question, or (c) the
agency makes a change that renders moot the concerns raised in the comments in question.
Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 433–34.
134. Golden, supra note 58, at 259; see also KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 210 (“Determining whether interest groups that participate get what they want is an analytical task as difficult
as it is important. Much must be known about the law that established the boundaries of the rulemaking, the true preferences of the groups affected, the accuracy of the communication of those
preferences to the agency decision makers, and the benefits the rule bestows and the costs it imposes.”).
135. CROLEY, supra note 34, at 132–33 (“[S]ome studies concluding that interest groups influence rulemaking find influence in the form of curtailing the scope of a proposed rule rather than
altering the rule’s content. To that extent, interest groups do not get what they want from agencies,
but merely less of what they do not want.”).
136. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 212 (describing several examples from case
studies illustrating “that business interests do gain important concessions in rulemaking even when
they are not able to achieve all they wanted”). Granted, Cuéllar’s definition of “adopted suggestion”
encompasses cases where the agency doesn’t fully adopt the commenter’s request, but only if the
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Hypothesis 3: Focusing on changes made during the notice-andcomment period may overstate business influence.
Although most of the empirical literature focuses on changes made to
rules during one or two stages of the rulemaking process, changes made during one stage may have been shaped by influence exerted at earlier stages or
be negated by subsequent developments. For instance, Magat, Krupnick, and
Harrington find that rules which start out more stringent are more likely to
become less stringent at a later stage. 137 Ideally, then, gauging interest group
influence requires evaluating the changes made to a rule over its entire lifecycle, though this is difficult for reasons explored below. 138
In particular, although much of the literature focuses on the notice-andcomment period, there are reasons to think that business interests may be
more successful at this stage of the rulemaking process than in the rest of the
rulemaking process. Some scholars have suggested that agencies may be
more likely to grant requests from commenters seeking a less stringent rule
because the agencies view such changes “as less vulnerable to arguments that
‘material changes’ were made as compared with comments that demand adjustments or additions to the text.” 139 If a court rules that the final rule is not
the “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule, then the court could force the
agency to repeat notice-and-comment all over again or even reissue the rule
entirely. 140 For the same reason, the types of changes that agencies can make
to rules at this late stage of the rulemaking process are relatively limited.

agency explicitly states in the final rule preamble that it altered the rule in response to the commenter’s suggestion. Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 433–34. Since agencies usually do not describe all
of the changes that they made to a proposed rule, it seems likely that this will still understate interest
group influence.
137. MAGAT, KRUPNICK & HARRINGTON, supra note 88, at 74, 153–54 (“[I]f a rule under consideration is made especially stringent during an early stage of the process, it is likely to become
less stringent at a later stage.”).
138. See infra note 151 and accompanying text; see also Furlong, supra note 7, at 341 (“Future
research may want to look at the development of policies from ‘cradle to grave’ and examine interest
group participation throughout. This may help in developing a better measure of influence that
others may apply to future studies.”).
139. Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 132 & n.118 (“One possible implication of the
need to provide adequate notice is a bias in favor of subtractive changes in proposed rules. Deletions
in response to public comment thus are not subject to the criticism that they have caught stakeholders by surprise.” (quoting William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed
Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 581 (2009))); West, supra
note 94, at 67 (“Changes are made frequently enough during the comment phase of rulemaking, but
they tend to be small and painful, and they are often subtractive rather than innovative or additive.”).
140. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007) (quoting Nat’l Black
Media Coal. v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d Cir. 1986)); Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note
13, at 110 (citing Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 856, 893–900 (2007)).
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Coglianese also suggests that focusing on the notice-and-comment period may exaggerate interest group influence because at least some of the
changes made during this process in particular may reflect strategic behavior
on the part of agencies, rather than substantive policy concessions.141 Former
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) Administrator
Thomas Scully recently made a similar claim in an interview with Politico,
describing the notice-and-comment period as a sort of bargaining process:
“You put out a proposed rule knowing that people are going to go a little
crazy and then you come back, and they’ll be so excited and relieved that the
final rule’s half as bad as the proposed rule was.” 142 For all of these reasons,
focusing solely on the notice-and-comment period will tend to overstate the
influence of organizations seeking less stringent rules.
Hypothesis 4: Businesses may be more successful in part because they
make more limited and realistic requests.
Finally, it is possible that business interests are more likely to receive
their desired changes than other types of interest groups in part because they
ask for more limited changes. This is in line with Wagner, Barnes, and Peters’ suggestion that agencies may be more likely to reject public interest
groups’ comments because they “were more ambitious and demanded material changes to the rule.” 143 Similarly, Cuéllar hypothesizes that more sophisticated commenters may know how to make suggestions that fall within the
scope of the rulemaking. 144 Yet most of the empirical literature has been
unable to devise a consistent way to measure the substantive significance of
specific changes in the rule. 145

141. Cary Coglianese, Outsized Influence and Unfair Outcomes? Business Involvement in the
Regulatory Process 10 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
142. Running CMS: What it’s Like, and What Seema Verma May Do, POLITICO’S PULSE
CHECK, at 19:28–19:35 (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/politicos-pulsecheck/e/running-cms-what-its-like-and-what-seema-verma-may-do-49144932. But see Wagner,
Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 148–49 (enumerating several reasons why it seems unlikely that
agencies could perfectly anticipate industry pressure and negate it by issuing an extra-stringent proposed rule). It is possible that both of these assessments are correct: Agencies may counterbalance
some interest group pressure through issuing an overly stringent proposed rule without negating it
entirely. If that is the case, then focusing solely on changes made during this stage of the rulemaking
process will still tend to overestimate influence.
143. Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 132. But see Yackee & Yackee, supra note
13, at 136–37 (finding no support for the hypothesis that “business commenters communicate a
greater level of information and expertise than do other commenters”).
144. Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 484–85.
145. See, e.g., Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 130 n.115 (acknowledging that they
“were not able to determine reliably whether the changes were ‘big’ or ‘little’ . . . thus, there is still
the distinct possibility that even if there is some indication of interest group impacts on the proposed
rule as a result of comments, whether these impacts are substantively important is unclear”). They
note that EPA identified the rule changes that they focus on as “significant;” but concede that “this

728

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:700

II. CASE STUDY: THE TANK CAR RULE
A. Methodology
1. Study Design
To investigate the four hypotheses, this Article examines a case study
of interest group influence in the rulemaking process. The case study focuses
on the “Tank Car Rule” (“HM-251”)—a suite of standards jointly promulgated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(“PHMSA”) and the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) in May 2015,
in coordination with Canadian regulators. 146
Although focusing on a single rule obviously limits the generalizability
of this study’s conclusions, 147 using a case study approach has two primary
advantages: First, it allows for a more fine-grained analysis of how interest
groups participate in and influence the regulatory process that considers multiple dimensions of participation and influence, as well as the specific policy
changes that they requested. 148 Second, whereas most previous studies of
influence in the rulemaking process have tended to focus on one or two stages
of the rulemaking process (most commonly, the notice-and-comment period), focusing on only one rule makes it possible to examine interest group
influence over the lifecycle of the rule.149
The major empirical component of this study involves translating the
materials in the regulatory docket into quantitative data that can then be analyzed. The DOT received over 3300 comments, several petitions to initiate
a rulemaking, and a number of administrative and judicial appeals on the
Tank Car Rule. Some of this participation was by organized interest groups

may be a relative term that selects out the most important changes relative to the rest and does not
indicate objectively that the changes are indeed important.” Id. One exception is Haeder & Yackee,
supra note 13, at 513 (manually scoring rule changes during OMB review as “of minor substantive
importance (1), moderate importance (2), or major importance (3)”).
146. See discussion infra Section II.B.
147. MAGAT, KRUPNICK & HARRINGTON, supra note 88, at 165 (“Without examining a large
number of regulations, idiosyncratic factors are difficult to separate from the general influences on
rulemaking.”).
148. Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics? The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1495, 1561 (2005) (“Empirical studies that focus on a single type of activity, therefore, may overlook or distort the extent of a corporation’s political involvement. Similarly, empirical studies virtually never consider more subtle forms of political influence, including lobbying and testimony by
in-house employees, participation in the ‘revolving door’ of hiring former government officials and
staffers, development and exploitation of relationships between corporate and political leaders, and
corporate philanthropy. One of the advantages of the case study methodology is that it identifies
factors that may be omitted from broader based empirical studies.” (footnote omitted)).
149. Furlong, supra note 7, at 341 (“Future research may want to look at the development of
policies from ‘cradle to grave’ and examine interest group participation throughout.”).
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(e.g., businesses, non-profits, etc.), while some of it (in particular, many of
the public comments) was by individuals.
For each public submission in the regulatory docket, I code various
characteristics about the individual or organization and their submission, including the organization type (e.g., individual, business, industry association,
state/local government), what form the participation takes (e.g., comment on
the NPRM, comment on the ANPRM, petition for rulemaking), how sophisticated they were, and whether their submission appeared to be a form letter. 150
I measure whether the participants’ desired rule changes were reflected
in the final rule using two different measures: First, I code whether the overall
stringency of one or more of the major pieces of the rule shifted in the direction the participant wanted. Second, to the extent possible, I attempt to code
how many discrete policy concerns each submission raised and whether the
specific concerns it raised were reflected in the final rule. For the latter, I try
to count a request as being addressed in the final rule only if it was clear that
it was completely addressed in the final rule. To do this, I undertake a detailed examination of the final rule and compare it to what the participants in
the rulemaking process requested. To supplement this analysis, I also conduct several informal interviews with government officials, industry representatives, and non-governmental staff who were closely involved with the
development of this rule.
There were a number of different stages of the Tank Car Rule rulemaking process, and there were opportunities at each stage for individuals and
interest groups to participate in this process. Figure 1 illustrates the major
stages at which DOT issued a new version of the rule—or officially rejected
requests to further amend the rule—as well as the ways that interest groups
and individuals participated in at each stage of this process.

150. For more detail on these categories, see Methodological Appendix.
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FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE TANK CAR RULE RULEMAKING PROCESS
ANPRM
(Sept. 2013)

NPRM
(Aug. 2014)

Final Rule
(May 2015)

• Petitions for
Rulemaking

• Comments
• 12866 Meetings

• Comments
• 12866 Meetings

Denial of
Appeals
(Nov. 2015)
• Administrative
Appeals

Final Rule
Codifying
FAST Act
Revisions
(Aug. 2016)

Judicial Review
(2015-ongoing)
• Petitions for
Judicial Review

• Lobbying
Congress

That being said, not every issue that eventually became part of the Tank
Car Rule was under consideration at each stage, and not every group or individual who participated in the process did so at each stage. Furthermore,
there is more public information about interest groups’ participation at some
stages than at others. For example, whereas all petitions and public comments are made available at regulations.gov, there are no public records of
the conversations that transpired at 12,866 meetings. Nor were these the only
ways that interest groups participated in the Tank Car Rule process. For example, DOT regulators are not required to record and publish contacts that
they had with outside groups that occurred before they issued the proposed
rule. 151
Thus, by necessity I focus on different stages of the rulemaking process
and use different metrics to investigate the four hypotheses enumerated
above. 152 First, I examine consensus among interest groups throughout the
rulemaking process, primarily, but not exclusively, at the ANPRM and
NPRM stages. Second, to examine how different measures of influence may
yield different results, I compare participants’ positions on the NPRM to the
final rule. In keeping with much of the empirical literature on this subject, I
151. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 112 (“The agency is required to log ex
parte contacts in the public record only after publishing the proposed rule and generally not before.”
(citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977))).
152. See supra Section I.B.4; see also GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 48
(1994) (“Our data need not all be at the same level of analysis. Disaggregated data, or observations
from a different time period, or even from a different part of the world, may provide additional
observable implications of a theory.”).
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focus on these two late stages because they yield the most documentary evidence of what changes participants were asking for, as well as how DOT
responded to those requests. In addition, by these late stages in the rulemaking process, most of the major elements of the rule were on the table, as well
as several potential changes to the rule that were ultimately not adopted.
Third, in contrast to much of the previous literature and in spite of the associated measurement difficulties, I try to assess how much influence interest
groups exert over the entire rulemaking process, from submitting petitions to
review to filing litigation in court. Finally, to examine whether business
groups ask for more limited changes to the rule than other types of interest
groups and individual members of the public, I focus on the number and type
of concerns that they raised in their comments on the proposed rule.
One important disclaimer is that this study does not pass judgment on
any of the policy choices or preferences of the various government officials
or interest groups that participated in this rulemaking process. The focus of
this study is on examining—to the extent possible—how interest groups participated and to what extent they influenced the rulemaking process, not on
whether this participation and influence ultimately led to positive or negative
results.
2. Case Selection
The Tank Car rule was selected for this case study for a few reasons:
First, it provides a rich and complex portrait of interest group and individual
participation in the rulemaking process, which enables me to examine differences and similarities among how interest groups and individuals engage in
the rulemaking process. Over 400 different interest groups—including businesses, state and local governments, and non-profit organizations—along
with thousands of individual members of the public, participated in the rulemaking process and expressed their views on the rule to federal regulators.
At the same time, however, the participation in the rulemaking process was
not so overwhelming as to make manual content analysis practically impossible. 153
Second, this rule illustrates the many different ways that interest groups
can engage at different stages of the rulemaking process and how focusing
on different stages of this process can lead to different conclusions about the
extent and effectiveness of this participation. Interest groups were involved
at every stage of the development of the Tank Car Rule, from helping to
153. By contrast, a proposal by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to roll back
“Net Neutrality” rules reportedly received 21.9 million comments. Jon Brodkin, Net Neutrality
Comment Deadline Is Tomorrow; 21.9 Million Comments in So Far, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 29,
2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/08/net-neutrality-comment-deadline-is-tomorrow21-9-million-comments-in-so-far/.
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highlight the inadequacy of current regulations, formulating new standards
that were eventually adopted in the Tank Car Rule, generating pressure to
pass the rule, participating in the notice-and-comment process, appealing to
PHMSA and FRA—referred to hereafter simply as the DOT—to change
some of the requirements in the rule, challenging the rule in court, and lobbying Congress to amend the rule. 154
Third, the Tank Car Rule was a high-salience rule that received a substantial amount of attention from Congress, the media, and a wide range of
different interest groups. 155 Most previous empirical studies of influence in
the rulemaking process have tended to focus on relatively less salient rulemakings, and influence in these contexts may differ. 156 Finally, since much
of the early scholarly literature on regulatory capture focused on the regulation of railroads, this seemed like a natural place to look for evidence of interest group influence over the regulatory process. 157
That being said, focusing on a single high-salience rule also has disadvantages, as the dynamics surrounding the Tank Car Rule are unlikely to be
representative of the rulemaking process as a whole. Like other case studies
of high-salience rules, this study—viewed in isolation—may give the impression that interest groups are more intensely engaged in the rulemaking process than they actually are. 158 As Kerwin and Furlong point out, many rules
published in the federal register “are quite minor, routine, and noncontroversial,” and are therefore “not likely to attract much notice from interest groups
because their individual effects are small.” 159 In particular, the amount of
attention that the Tank Car Rule received from public interest groups and the
general public is unrepresentative of most rulemakings. 160
B. Rule Background
The Tank Car Rule was a discretionary rule, issued pursuant to DOT’s
longstanding authority under Title 49, section 5103(b) of the United States
Code, which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous materials in
154. See infra fig.3.
155. See infra Section II.B.
156. See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 137.
157. See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L. J. 467 (1952); Stigler, supra note 24; see also Nicholas
Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing agency capture of PHMSA as a
possible explanation for the explosion of a natural-gas pipeline in California in 2010).
158. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 190 (“If we were to rely solely on case studies, we
would immediately conclude that participation by interest groups is a prominent part of all rulemaking.”).
159. Id. at 191.
160. See supra notes 53–62.
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intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.” 161 The pressure to develop the
rule began to build as the production of crude oil in the United States started
rising sharply in 2009 and 2010, after having declined for many years.162 The
production of crude increased by around 70% from 2010 to 2015, in large
part due to increased drilling in shale formations (most notably the Bakken
shale formation). 163 Ethanol production in the U.S. also ramped up considerably around this time. 164
Historically, most crude oil was transported via pipeline or vessel.165
However, since there now wasn’t sufficient pipeline capacity to transport all
this new crude oil and ethanol, shippers turned to rail as a stopgap measure. 166
According to analysis from the Association of American Railroads
(“AAR”)—an industry trade group that focuses on the U.S. freight rail industry 167—the volume of crude oil transported by rail increased by 131% between 2010 and 2014. 168 By 2015, DOT reported that crude oil and ethanol
comprised around 68% of the flammable liquids transported by rail. 169 The
number of tank cars carrying ethanol grew 40% from 2008 to 2011. 170 Shippers increasingly employed the DOT-111—a general-purpose tank car whose
design dates back to the 1960s—to transport this surfeit of oil and ethanol. 171
Yet, the DOT-111 car was historically used for transporting non-flammable

161. 49 U.S.C. § 5103(b) (2012).
162. Domestic Oil Production Reversed Decades-Long Decline in 2009 and 2010, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=1130.
163. Id.; U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus1&f=a (last visited Mar.
30, 2019).
164. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for HighHazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,645 (May 8, 2015) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
171, 172, 173, 174, 179).
165. Id. at 26,644.
166. Clifford Krauss & Jad Mouawad, Accidents Surge as Oil Industry Takes the Train, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/business/energy-environment/accidents-surge-as-oil-industry-takes-the-train.html.
167. About Us, ASS’N OF AM. RAILROADS, https://www.aar.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2020).
168. BOB FRONCZAK, ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., RAIL TRANSPORT OF PETROLEUM, NATURAL GAS
AND ETHANOL 7 (2016).
169. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for HighHazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,645.
170. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for HighHazard Flammable Trains, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,016, 45,030 (Aug. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pt. 171, 172, 173, 174, and 179).
171. Jad Mouawad, Despite Orders, Federal Tank-Car Safety Measures Are Slow in Coming,
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/business/despite-orders-federaltank-car-safety-measures-are-slow-in-coming.html.
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hazardous materials and was “long known to be ill suited for transporting
flammable material.” 172
Soon, there was an uptick in rail accidents involving crude oil and ethanol, and there were devastating consequences. The early accidents involved
ethanol. In June 2009, a train carrying ethanol derailed near Cherry Valley,
Illinois, killing one passenger and injuring several persons. 173 The release of
ethanol from the train and the resulting fire prompted a mandatory evacuation
of 600 residences and resulted in around $7.9 million of damage. 174 Accidents involving crude oil began to pile up, too, going from zero accidents in
2010 to five in 2013. 175 From 1975 to 2012, railroads spilled 800,000 gallons
of crude oil, and in 2013 alone, they spilled 1.15 million gallons. 176 In its
findings stemming from its investigation of the Cherry Valley derailment, the
National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”)—an independent government body charged with investigating and reporting on civil transportation
accidents—determined that the DOT-111 “can almost always be expected to
breach in derailments that involve pileups or multiple car-to-car impacts.” 177
NTSB filed several petitions with PHMSA urging it to update its safety standards. 178
Members of Congress also sent letters to FRA and PHMSA, “urging
prompt, responsive actions.” 179 Around the same time as the NTSB was focusing on this issue, the AAR’s Tank Car Committee—a self-regulatory body
with representation from the railroad industry, the shipping industry, and the
car owner/manufacturing industry that studies the railroad industry and helps
to set standards for railroads—created a task force in 2011 to study how to
reduce the risk of these events.180 Ultimately, this Committee came up with

172. Id.; Jad Mouawad, New Oil Train Rules Are Hit from All Sides, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/business/energy-environment/us-sets-new-rules-for-oilshipments-by-rail.html.
173. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCIDENT REPORT: DERAILMENT OF CN
FREIGHT TRAIN U70691–18 WITH SUBSEQUENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE AND FIRE,
CHERRY VALLEY, ILLINOIS, JUNE 19, 2009 1 (2012).
174. Id.
175. See 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,019.
176. Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 166.
177. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation Letter (Mar. 2,
2012), at 2.
178. Id.
179. 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,026.
180. Petition of Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. to Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., Petition
for Rulemaking: Tank Car Standards for DOT Class 111 Tank Cars Used for Packing Group I and
II Materials (Mar. 9, 2011); see 49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179 (2015).
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a specification for a new standard, the CPC-1232, which increased the thickness of the tank car shell.181 The AAR, on behalf of the committee, petitioned
PHMSA to adopt these standards. 182
DOT recognized that the new industry standards improved on the old
DOT-111 design, but it argued that these improvements did not go far enough
and suggested a number of additional safety features. 183 As a result, the Tank
Car Committee put together a task force with representation from FRA,
AAR, and the ethanol and oil industries which considered a number of additional safety requirements, but the committee failed to arrive at a consensus. 184 The DOT decided to move forward with a rulemaking process to put
the new standards in place anyway, but the effort stalled amidst concerns that
the regulation’s costs would outweigh its benefits. 185
Then, on July 6, 2013, a train of DOT-111 tank cars filled with crude oil
from the Bakken Formation in North Dakota derailed and exploded in a small
Quebec town called Lac-Mégantic, killing at least forty-two people and incinerating much of the town’s infrastructure. 186 In the following weeks and
months, members of Congress ratcheted up pressure on the White House and
federal regulators to respond, while the NTSB issued several more recommendations to PHMSA and FRA. 187 Deborah Hersman, the former chairwoman of the NTSB, ominously warned in 2014 that not updating the standards could result in a “higher body count.” 188
This pressure helped to jumpstart DOT’s heretofore-moribund regulatory initiative. Only a few months later, on September 6, 2013, the FRA and
PHMSA issued an ANPRM seeking comment on several petitions for rulemaking, among them the petition that the AAR Tank Car Committee had

181. 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,030.
182. Id.
183. Id.; PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., T87.6 TASK FORCE SUMMARY
REPORT (2013).
184. Id.
185. Telephone Interview with Government Official (March 3, 2017) (conducted on condition
of anonymity).
186. Ian Austen, Deadly Derailment in Quebec Underlines Oil Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/world/americas/deadly-derailment-in-quebec-underlines-oil-debate.html; Ian Austen, In Quebec Town, Fires Are Out, but Recovery is Distant, N.Y.
TIMES (July 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/world/americas/in-quebec-town-firesare-out-but-recovery-is-distant.html.
187. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for HighHazard Flammable Trains, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,016, 45,024–45,026 (proposed Aug. 1, 2014) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179).
188. Mouawad, supra note 171.
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submitted back in 2011. 189 FRA and PHMSA then worked together to develop a more comprehensive set of rules geared at improving safety for the
transportation of flammable liquids by rail and ushering it through the noticeand-comment process. The rulemaking process occupied another year and a
half, and on May 8, 2015, DOT issued the final version of HM-251, the Tank
Car Rule. 190
The final rule is wide-ranging and touches on a wide array of regulatory
issues, including instituting new tank design standards, speed restrictions,
braking technologies, and notification requirements. In the preamble to the
final rule, DOT summarizes thirteen different main issues that it considered
in developing the final rule 191:
1. Harmonization
The DOT developed the Tank Car Rule in consultation with Transport
Canada (the Canadian government agency responsible for transportation regulations), and the Tank Car Rule attempts to harmonize the U.S. regulations
with Canada’s regulations “[t]o the extent possible,” but it does not fully harmonize some provisions, such as the brake requirements and speed limits. 192
2. Definition of High-Hazard Flammable Train
The regulation defines certain trains carrying large volumes of flammable liquids as “high-hazard flammable trains” (“HHFTs”) and applies certain
parts of the regulation—the speed limits, braking restrictions, and routing requirements—only to trains that meet this definition. 193 The final rule defines
an HHFT as “a single train transporting [twenty] or more loaded tank cars
containing Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a single train
carrying [thirty-five] or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid
throughout the train consist.” 194

189. Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation (RRR), 78 Fed. Reg. 54,849, 54,850-54,851 (Sept. 6, 2013) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 173, 174, 178, 179,180).
190. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for HighHazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,645 (May 8, 2015) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
171, 172, 173, 174, and 179).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 26,662.
193. Id. at 26,663–26,664.
194. Id. at 26,664.
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3. Crude Oil Treatment
The NPRM had explored the idea of requiring that crude oil be “pretreated” so that it is less volatile before being transported, but the final rule
does not require pre-treatment of crude oil. 195
4. Scope of Rulemaking
The DOT received a number of requests to expand the proposals in the
rule beyond flammable liquids to all hazardous materials, but the final rule
applies only to flammable liquids. 196
5. New Tank Car Construction
The NPRM proposed three possible sets of safety features (such as increased shell thickness, thermal protection systems, etc.) for new tank cars,
ranging from most stringent to least stringent. 197 The final rule adopts the
intermediate option. 198
6. Retrofit Standard
The final rule requires that existing tank cars be retrofitted only to meet
the least stringent of the three options proposed in the NPRM. 199
7. Performance Standard
To encourage innovation in tank car design, the final rule provides that
tank cars can be designed in different ways as long as they meet certain performance criteria. 200
8. Implementation Timeline
The rule provides a “risk-based” timeline over which existing tank cars
must be retrofitted, taking into account the material they are transporting and
the type of tank car. 201

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 26,665.
Id. at 26,666.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26,675.
Id. at 26,679.
Id.
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9. Speed Restrictions
The final rule adopts a forty mile-per-hour speed limit in “High-Threat
Urban Areas” (defined as “an area comprising one or more cities and surrounding areas including a [ten]-mile buffer zone”). 202
10. Advanced Brake Signal Propagation Systems
The final rule requires all HHFTs to have an end-of-train or distributed
power braking system, and requires a subset of HHFTs meeting the definition
of a “high-hazard flammable unit train” (defined as “a train comprised of
[seventy] or more loaded tank cars containing Class 3 flammable liquids traveling speeds at greater than [thirty miles-per-hour]”) to be equipped with an
electronically controlled pneumatic (“ECP”) braking system when transporting flammable liquids. 203
11. Classification
The rule requires shippers to adopt a sampling and testing program for
unrefined-petroleum products. 204
12. Routing
The rule requires railroad companies to perform an analysis that considers at least twenty-seven specified safety and security factors when they are
making routing decisions. 205
13. Notification
The rule requires railroads to identify a point of contact on routing issues
and to provide that information to state and local officials in affected jurisdictions. 206
Even after the Tank Car Rule was finalized in May 2015, the rule continued to evolve, and interest groups continued to lobby for further changes
to the rule. Within weeks of DOT’s issuing the final rule, several interest
groups filed administrative appeals with DOT and submitted petitions for judicial review in the federal courts of appeals. DOT rejected all of the administrative appeals in November 2015. 207 However, the following month, Congress passed the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (“FAST”) Act, a
wide-ranging transportation funding and authorization law that—among
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 26,646 n.10, 26,691–26,692.
Id. at 26,645, 26,692.
Id. at 26,652.
Id. at 26,651.
Id. at 26,652.
80 Fed. Reg. 71,952, 71,973 (Nov. 18, 2015).
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many other things—made several important amendments to the Tank Car
Rule, which I discuss below. 208 DOT issued a regulation codifying many of
these changes in August 2016. 209
C. Findings
1. Consensus Among Interest Groups
Hypothesis 1: Businesses may take very different positions on
regulatory issues, even when they are broadly in favor of less
regulation.
Table 1 shows that in their comments on the proposed rule, many otherwise diverse interest groups are nevertheless internally unified in their respective positions as to whether they desired the Tank Car Rule to become
more or less stringent. The vast majority of comments were submitted by (in
order of most comments to least comments): individual members of the public, individual businesses, state or local governments, public interest groups
(groups concerned with issues of general welfare such as the environment or
consumer protection), and industry associations. In line with the existing
literature (which mostly focuses on comments at the NPRM stage), I find that
businesses, industry associations, public interest groups, and members of the
public all display internal cohesiveness, with businesses and industry associations predominantly seeking less stringent regulations and public interest
groups and individuals seeking more stringent regulations. 210 State and local
governments were slightly more divided, but most of them (76.64%) sought
a more stringent regulation.

208. See infra notes 274–276.
209. Hazardous Materials: FAST Act Requirements for Flammable Liquids and Rail Tank Cars,
81 Fed. Reg. 53,935 (Aug. 15, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 173, 179).
210. See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13, at 132 (finding that over 83% of business commenters in their study sought less stringent regulations).
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TABLE 1: COMMENTERS’ POSITIONS ON THE NPRM (N=3,231)

Commenter
Type

N

More
Stringent
(%)

Less
Stringent
(%)

No
Change
(%)

Unclear
(%)

Part More
Stringent,
Part Less
Stringent
(%)

Individual

2713

89.31

0.66

0.18

9.77

0.07

Business

225

2.67

89.78

0.44

1.78

4.89

State/Local

137

76.64

17.52

0.73

1.46

3.65

Industry
Association

63

3.17

80.95

0

3.17

12.70

Public
Interest

58

81.03

3.45

5.17

8.62

1.72

Congress

12

66.67

16.67

8.33

0

8.33

Native
American

7

100

0

0

0

0

Labor

6

83.33

0

16.67

0

0

Other

4

100

0

0

0

0

Academic

3

33.33

0

0

66.67

0

Other
Fed. Gov.

3

100

0

0

0

0

However, industry associations and businesses were both less unified
with respect to their positions on the ANPRM, with substantial fractions of
industry associations and businesses calling for the existing regulatory regime to become more stringent, at least in some respects. 211 This suggests,
in line with the account offered above, 212 that a substantial fraction of the
business community viewed the regulations governing the transportation of

211. See infra tbl.2.
212. See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
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flammable liquids by rail that were in place before the Tank Car Rule as inadequate, even though most of them ultimately viewed the standards in the
Tank Car Rule NPRM as having gone too far. 213
TABLE 2: COMMENTERS’ POSITIONS ON THE ANPRM (N=83)

Commenter
Type

N

More
Stringent
(%)

Less
Stringent
(%)

No
Change
(%)

Unclear
(%)

Part More
Stringent,
Part Less
Stringent
(%)

Individual

16

62.50

6.25

0

31.25

0

State/Local

29

89.66

0

6.90

3.45

0

Industry
Association

14

7.14

57.14

0

14.29

21.43

Business

9

22.22

44.44

0

11.11

22.22

Public
Interest

9

100

0

0

0

0

Congress

2

100

0

0

0

0

Labor

2

100

0

0

0

0

Other
Fed. Gov.

2

50

0

50

0

0

Moreover, although businesses and industry groups may have been relatively united in their overall position on the stringency of the rule throughout
the rulemaking process, they held quite different views on some important
specific aspects of the rule. In particular, the interests of railroad companies
and tank car manufacturers sharply diverged with those of the shippers of
goods (such as oil and ethanol companies) and the owners of tank car equipment. Because railroad companies do not own the tank cars that they
transport (these cars are usually owned by either the shippers or the tank car
manufacturers) but do have liability in the event of a rail accident, they are
generally in favor of more rigid tank car standards. 214 Railroad companies
213. See supra Section II.B.
214. Compare Joan Lowy, Influence Game: Shaping Railroad Safety Rules, WASH. EXAMINER
(July 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/influence-game-shaping-railroad-safetyrules/article/2148796 (“The [AAR], for example, is pushing for tougher safety standards for tank
cars than the current, voluntary standards agreed to by industry in 2011. Railroads, though, typically
don’t own or lease tank cars and so wouldn’t have to buy new cars or retrofit existing ones. The oil
and ethanol industries that own the cars want to stick with the voluntary standards, also known as
‘1232’ tank cars.”), with Daniel Machalaba, Railroads Push to Harden Tank Cars—Some Chemical
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thus had been lobbying DOT for stricter regulation of tank cars since well
before the Tank Car Rule was issued. 215
Although shippers and railroads aligned on certain issues in the proposed rule (such as the brake requirement and speed restrictions), they diverged on others. For example, in its comments on the proposed rule, the
AAR “urge[d] PHMSA to adopt an aggressive phase-out schedule for cars
that cannot meet retrofit requirements.” 216 Likewise, tank car manufacturers,
such as Greenbrier Companies, “encourage[d] PHMSA to finalize a rule for
new cars and retrofits of existing cars that permits the industry to make these
changes as rapidly as possible.” 217
By contrast, shippers and owners of tank cars were in general more resistant to imposing retrofit requirements for existing tank cars. For example,
the Railway Supply Institute (the industry association representing freight car
owners) warned in its comments that “PHMSA’s [p]roposed [m]odification
[t]imeline [c]annot be [a]chieved [b]ased on [r]epair [n]etwork [f]acility
[c]onstraints and [d]oes [n]ot [a]ccount for [s]everal [u]nintended [c]onsequences.” 218 Similarly, the American Petroleum Institute (the largest industry association representing oil and gas companies) complained that
“PHMSA’s proposed phase-out is highly ambitious and only works when
there are very optimistic assumptions.” 219
These differences continued to play out at later stages of the rulemaking
process. For example, after DOT finalized the Tank Car Rule, AAR submitted an administrative appeal to DOT, among other things, arguing that the
rule should be expanded to apply to all cars carrying Class 3 flammable liquids—regardless of their number or arrangement on the train—and that DOT

Makers Balk at Cost of Overhaul, Sought Following Deadly Accidents, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 18,
2006) (noting that “the redesigns are fiercely opposed by some chemical companies, which see little
more than a push to shift expenses and liability away from railroads”).
215. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Comments Before the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251): Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car
Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains 1 (Sept. 30, 2014) (“In
2011, AAR petitioned PHMSA to adopt new tank car standards for packing group I and II materials,
including flammable liquids. In comments responding to the 2013 ANPRM, AAR endorsed new
tank car standards for all class 3 flammable liquids, including those classified as packing group III.
AAR strongly supports new tank car standards for all class 3 flammable liquids.”).
216. Id. at 41.
217. Greenbrier Cos., Inc., Comments Before the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251) Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car
Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains 13–14 (Aug. 1, 2014).
218. Thomas D. Simpson, President, Railway Supply Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
for Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard
Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 25 (Sept. 30, 2014).
219. Robert L. Greco, III, Grp. Dir., Am. Petroleum Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
for Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard
Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 22 (Sept. 30, 2014).
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should mandate that all tank cars carrying flammable liquids be equipped
with new safety requirements. 220
These demands contrasted with those of the shippers. Although the
American Petroleum Institute (representing oil companies) had supported
thermal blankets and pressure relief devices in its comments on the NPRM,
it did not mention either of these issues in its appeal; 221 Growth Energy (representing ethanol companies) argued that the new tank car and retrofit standards should exclude ethanol; 222 by contrast, the American Chemistry Council
(representing American chemical manufacturers) argued that PHMSA should
narrow the scope of the rule so that it applied only to crude oil and ethanol. 223
These different views made for some strange bedfellows. For instance,
on some of the issues in its administrative appeal, AAR was in alignment
with a coalition of environmental groups and local governments who also
sued DOT, and who were similarly pushing DOT to expand the scope of the
rule and impose the same safety features. 224 In addition, interviews with government officials involved in the rulemaking process also suggest that the
AAR’s desire for more stringent regulations were actually in line with the
views of at least some regulators, even though these officials ultimately did
not feel they were able to include such provisions in the final rule.225
The AAR’s support for stricter standards likely resulted in the Tank Car
Rule being more stringent than it otherwise would have been. For instance,
Congress ended up amending Tank Car Rule to include some of the safety
features for which AAR had advocated, 226 and to expand the scope of the

220. See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., supra note 215, at 40–41; see also Eric de Place, Why New Improved Oil Trains Are Not Nearly Good Enough, SIGHTLINE INST. (Jan. 28, 2015) http://www.sightline.org/2015/01/28/why-new-improved-oil-trains-are-not-nearly-good-enough/.
221. Greco, supra note 219, at 28.
222. Tom Buis, Chief Exec. Officer, Growth Energy, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for
Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard
Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 4 (Mar. 13, 2015).
223. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Controls and Operational Controls for High
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,952, 71,954 (Nov. 18, 2015).
224. See, e.g., Earthjustice, Forest Ethics, Sierra Club, Nat’l Res. Def. Council, & Oil Change
Int’l, Comments Before the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Docket No.
PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251): Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains 21 (Sept. 30, 2014) (“We strongly oppose allowing unsafe tank cars, including any DOT-111s or CPC-1232 tank cars, to continue to be used to
ship crude oil and ethanol in any configuration unless retrofitted, including in blocks of fewer than
[twenty] cars.”)
225. Telephone Interview with Government Official (March 29, 2017) (conducted on condition
of anonymity).
226. See, e.g., Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 7305, 129
Stat. 1312, 1597 (2015) (Thermal Blankets) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155).
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retrofit requirements. 227 Shortly thereafter, the coalition of environmental
petitioners and local governments dropped their lawsuit. 228
2. Different Measures of Influence
Hypothesis 2: Businesses may often not receive their desired rule
changes, even when the stringency of the rule shifts in the direction
that they desire.
I use two strategies for measuring influence during the notice-and-comment process: First, I code whether each commenter asked for one or more
of the thirteen “major” issues highlighted above to become more stringent,
less stringent, or stay the same; then I code whether that part of the rule actually became more or less stringent, or stayed the same, from the proposed
rule stage to the final rule stage. 229 Cases where the desired rule change
matched the actual change are coded as a “1,” whereas cases where the desired rule change did not match the actual change are coded as “0.” The
commenter’s overall influence is measured as the mean of these values across
each commenter type (labeled “Influence 1” in Figure 2 below).
Second, I code the proportion of policy concerns raised in each comment that were completely addressed in the final rule, either because the specific part of the rule that they objected to was removed from the rule or because the revision that they suggested was fully adopted. 230 The commenter’s
overall influenced is measured as the proportion of policy concerns that were
completely addressed across each commenter type (labeled “Influence 2” in
Figure 2 below).
As in other empirical studies of influence which rely on content analysis, neither of these measures is causal; they both only report associations
between desired rule changes and changes in the actual rule. Because my
goal is to examine the differences among different measures of influence,
rather than to quantify precisely which interest groups had the most influence
in this rule, I report only bivariate correlations below for the five most-represented categories of commenters.

227. Id. at § 7304 (Phase-Out of All Tank Cars Used to Transport Class 3 Flammable Liquids)
(to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155).
228. Linda Chiem, DC Circ. Urged to Put Off Oil Train Safety Rule Challenge, LAW 360 (Mar.
22, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/774926/dc-circ-urged-to-put-off-oil-train-safety-rulechallenge (noting that environmental groups dropped their petition for judicial review of the Tank
Car Rule).
229. Intercoder reliability scores for the variable that recorded the number of issues that were
addressed in the final rule were somewhat weak. The percent agreement was nearly 72% when
counting all observations, but only 49% when counting only non-form letters. For more detail on
these categories, see the Methodological Appendix.
230. For more detail on these categories, see the Methodological Appendix.
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Using the first measure of influence, the businesses appear to wield disproportionate influence during the notice-and-comment stage of the rulemaking process, compared to individuals, public interest organizations, and state
and local governments. 231 This is not entirely surprising: Business commenters overwhelmingly preferred a less stringent rule, 232 and a plurality of major
pieces of the rule became less stringent than more stringent from the proposed
to the final rule stage.233 Of the thirteen major categories in the rule, five
became less stringent or adopted the least stringent of the options presented
in the proposed rule: The timeline over which the DOT-111 tank cars are to
be phased out is less ambitious, the scope is narrower, the retrofit standard is
the least stringent of the options proposed, the speed restriction is the least
stringent of the options proposed, and the braking requirement applies to
fewer trains. The remaining eight major issues in the rule either did not noticeably change or became more stringent in some respects and less so in
others. 234
FIGURE 2: INFLUENCE DURING THE NOTICE-AND-COMMENT PROCESS
Average Percentage of Influential Comment Requests
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231. Infra fig.2. Figures 2 and 4 separate out businesses from industry associations to see if
they have different levels of influence, whereas Figures 3 and 5 combine them to make the presentation more straightforward.
232. See supra tbl.1.
233. See Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for
High-Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,647–26,648 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179)
234. Id.
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Using the second measure of influence, industry associations still appear
to wield more influence than individuals and public interest groups, but the
gap among the different types of interest groups narrows substantially. 235 According to this measure, businesses actually exhibit less influence than public
interest groups, while individuals exert virtually no influence during the notice-and-comment process according to both measures of influence.236
As expected, the second measure of influence is also almost uniformly
lower than the first measure, 237 indicating that most of the time in which a
major piece of the rule moved in the direction that the commenter requested,
the commenter usually did not receive the specific change that he or she was
asking for. For example, one widely circulated form letter submitted by businesses cautioned that “any brake-system requirements that may affect speed
restrictions should be limited to proven technology” 238—a clear reference to
the ECP brake requirement in the Tank Car Rule NPRM, which businesses
repeatedly criticized as unproven technology. 239 Although the brake requirement became less strict from the proposed rule to the final rule, businesses’
request was ultimately not granted, as the brake requirement was included in
the final rule. 240
How to interpret the disparity between these two measures is unclear.
On the one hand, this disparity could be viewed as evidence that even the
most influential interest groups usually do not get exactly what they want in

235. See supra fig.2.
236. This latter finding aligns with Cuéllar’s research, which examines three rules and finds that
the average number of accepted suggestions made by individual members of the public was 0.01,
0.00, and 0.02, respectively. Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 462.
237. See supra fig.2.
238. See, e.g., Mike Gray, Exec. Vice President, Caljet of America LLC, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule for Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls
for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251), at 1 (Sept. 30,
2014).
239. See, e.g., David Schaper, Battle Over New Oil Train Standards Pits Safety Against Cost,
NPR (June 19, 2015, 3:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/06/19/414615187/battle-over-new-oiltrain-standards-pits-safety-against-cost (“AAR’s President Ed Hamberger discussed the problems
the railroads have with the new rules in an interview with NPR prior to filing the appeal. ‘The one
that we have real problems with is requiring something called ECP brakes—electronically controlled pneumatic brakes,’ he said, adding the new braking system that the federal government is
mandating is unproven.”).
240. In the proposed rule, all tank cars built after October 1, 2015 for use in an HHFT travelling
above thirty miles-per-hour would have had to be equipped with ECP brakes. See Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,
79 Fed. Reg. 45,016, 45,077 (Aug. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179).
However, the final rule only requires “high-hazard flammable unit trains” transporting certain types
of flammable liquids (a subset of HHFTs) to have ECP brakes by January 1, 2021. See Hazardous
Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable
Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,749 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173,
174, 179).
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the notice-and-comment process. On the other hand, it could be viewed as
evidence that interest groups treat the public comment process in bargaining
terms and deliberately request ambitious changes that they know are unlikely
to be granted, in the hope that more ambitious requests will be more likely to
change the rule in the direction they desire. Either way, it presents a more
limited picture of interest group influence in this rule: More often than not,
even the most influential interest groups did not get precisely the changes that
they asked for in the final rule.
3. Influence over the Course of the Rulemaking Process
Hypothesis 3: Focusing on changes made during the notice-andcomment period may overstate business influence.
Interest groups participated in the Tank Car Rule rulemaking process in
several other ways besides submitting a comment on the NPRM: submitting
petitions for rulemaking before the DOT had even begun developing a rule,
commenting on the ANPR, participating in meetings with OIRA, and appealing the final rule either through the DOT’s administrative appeal process or
in court. 241
Evaluating the effects of this participation at these other stages is more
difficult than doing so at the NPRM stage for two reasons: First, only a subset
of issues ultimately incorporated into the Tank Car Rule were discussed at
these stages. Second, for some of these stages, such as the OIRA review
process or ex parte meetings (i.e., “off the record” meetings) with outside
groups, there is little documentation about what interest groups were requesting (indeed, DOT did not possess any documentation of ex parte contacts in
this rule, so I do not consider these contacts below). 242 For these reasons,
most of the empirical literature does not attempt to measure influence over
all of these stages of the rulemaking process. Nevertheless, I attempt to evaluate influence at these other stages to the extent possible below by comparing
interest groups’ requests at these stages to the contents of the final rule.

241. Infra fig.3.
242. Telephone Interview with Dep’t of Transp. Hazardous Materials Info. Ctr. (Jan. 2017).
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FIGURE 3: PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
Percent of Total Participants in Each Stage
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The earliest documentation of interest groups’ positions on the Tank Car
Rule comes from the petitions they submitted urging PHMSA to issue a rule.
The Tank Car Rule ANPRM makes reference to twelve petitions for rulemaking: seven from different industry associations (four of which did not
address the regulations governing the transportation of flammable liquids by
rail, the subject of the Tank Car Rule), four from the NTSB, and one from a
coalition of local governments. 243 Of note, all of the petitions that were directly relevant to the Tank Car Rule (including those from industry associations) called for safety standards that were stronger than the status quo. 244
Again, this suggests that these industry groups viewed the regulatory regime
that pre-dated the Tank Car Rule as inadequate, even though the standards
that were ultimately adopted in the rule went beyond what some of them
would have liked. 245
Comparing their petitions to the final version of the Tank Car Rule reveals that the final rule is more stringent in several respects than what the
industry associations asked for:
• First, although several industry associations, including the AAR and the
American Petroleum Institute, submitted petitions in 2011 calling for

243. Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation (RRR), 78 Fed. Reg. 54,849, 54,850–54,851 (Sept. 6, 2013) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 173, 174, 178, 179, 180).
244. Id.
245. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
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new safety standards for DOT-111 tank cars carrying crude oil and
ethanol, the standards that ended up being adopted for new tank cars
in the final rule are more stringent than those these groups initially
endorsed. 246
• Second, the industries focused exclusively on raising standards for
newly constructed tank cars, but they either “recommend[ed] no modification or retrofit for existing [tank] cars,” or argued that any retrofit
requirements be addressed in a separate rulemaking. 247 By contrast,
the NTSB argued that new safety standards must also be applied to
the existing DOT-111 tank car fleet. 248 (This recommendation was
endorsed by the coalition of local governments.) 249 DOT ultimately
required that some existing tank cars be retrofitted in accordance with
the standards presented in the AAR Tank Car Committee’s petition,
the least stringent retrofit standard considered in the proposed rule. 250
• Third, the scope of the final rule was ultimately greater than the industry
petitions: Whereas several trade associations recommended that the
new standards be limited only to (or at least prioritize) tank cars carrying ethanol and crude oil, 251 the final rule applied to tank cars carrying other kinds of flammable liquids as well. 252
• Finally, the rule included a number of other requirements that industry
groups did not call for in their petitions, including speed restrictions,
requirements to adopt new brake technology, routing requirements,
and new rules to ensure the proper classification of products being
246. See supra notes 182–183 discussing AAR’s proposed tank car specification called the
CPC-1232; see also Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls
for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,669 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179) (comparing PHMSA’s chosen requirements for new tank
cars to an “enhanced” CPC-1232 standard).
247. Petition of Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., supra note 180, at 2; see Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. 54,849 (Sept. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 173, 174, 178, 179, and 180).
248. See Deborah A.P. Hersman, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation Letter
(Mar. 2, 2012), at 1, 6.
249. Petition of Vill. of Barrington, Ill. & The Reg’l Answer to Canadian Nation to Pipeline &
Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., Petition for Rulemaking: Tank Car Standards for the Existing
Fleet of DOT Class 111 Tank Cars Used for Packing Group I and II Materials; and Real-Time
Electronic Freight Consist Distribution 1–2 (Apr. 3, 2012) (“[A]s the National Transportation Safety
Board (‘NTSB’) has observed, AAR’s proposed rule doesn’t go far enough as it fails to encompass
the existing fleet of DOT-111 tank cars used to transport Groups I and II materials.”).
250. 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,647.
251. See, e.g., Robert L. Greco, III, supra note 219, at 30.
252. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,689 (“By defining a HHFT as a train with a continuous block of 20
or more tank cars or a total of 35 or more tank cars containing a Class 3 flammable liquid, we
address the specific risks of increasing crude oil and ethanol production while also anticipating the
potential for future risks presented by the increased production or transport of other Class 3 flammable liquids.”).
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shipped by rail. 253 That being said, some of the requirements that ultimately ended up being adopted in the final rule were less strict than
those that DOT considered in the proposed rule.
The standards that were ultimately adopted gave the NTSB and the coalition of local governments, both of which supported additional safety
measures, much—though not all—of what they asked for in their petitions.
The final rule promulgated by DOT addressed two of the four NTSB recommendations considered in the ANPRM (three of which were endorsed by the
coalition of local governments), 254 and Congress later amended the rule to
adopt NTSB’s third recommendation (requiring railroads to provide emergency responders with real-time information about the identity and location
of hazardous materials on trains). 255
The next stage of the rulemaking process for which there are materials
in the regulatory docket is the ANPRM comment period. Figure 4 shows
that, in contrast to the findings of most of the empirical literature, when one
looks at this stage of the comment process, state and local governments were
the most likely to have their policy concerns in these comments addressed in
the final rule, with businesses and industry associations, as well as public
interest organizations and individuals, much less likely to do so. 256

253. See Petition of Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., supra note 247.
254. 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,660.
255. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 7302, 129 Stat. 1312,
1597 (2015) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155).
256. Because the first measure of influence relies on coding whether each commenter asked for
one or more of the thirteen “major” issues highlighted in the final rule to become more stringent
(see supra text accompanying note 229), less stringent, or stay the same, and because these issues
were not defined at this early stage of the rulemaking process, I can only use the second measure of
influence.
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FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF POLICY CONCERNS IN ANPRM
COMMENTS ADDRESSED IN THE FINAL RULE
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The overwhelming success of state and local governments 257 is somewhat misleading, however, since it is due in large part to the fact that the
majority of their comments were form letters, which raised a single request
that ended up being reflected in the final rule (that DOT issue new regulations
to retrofit existing DOT-111 tank cars used to transport certain classes of
flammable liquids). When these form letters are removed, state and local
governments are still the most successful type of interest group but see less
than half of their suggestions granted in the final rule. The success rate of
public interest organizations also falls somewhat with the removal of form
letters, from roughly 29% to roughly 22%.
In addition to commenting on the proposed rule, interest groups also
participated in the OIRA review process—both before the proposed rule was
issued, as well as between when the proposed rule was issued and the final
rule was promulgated. Of the thirty-four meetings that OIRA held with outside organizations about the Tank Car Rule, eighteen were called by businesses, thirteen by industry associations, two by public interest groups, and
one by a labor group. 258 Although there are no transcripts of what transpired
in these meetings, the OIRA review process appears to have resulted in few
substantive changes to the rule, aside from some adjustments to the implementation timeline. Most of the documented changes between the draft final
257. Supra fig.4.
258. Meetings are categorized according to who is listed as having requested the meeting on
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport. Some meetings had participants from multiple kinds of interest groups.
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rule submitted to OIRA and the final rule were modifications to DOT’s justifications and analyses of the requirements in the rule. 259
After DOT issued the final rule, six interest groups (four industry associations—the Dangerous Goods Advisory Council, 260 the American Chemistry Council, 261 the AAR, 262 and the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers 263—one coalition of environmental groups and local
governments, 264 and one coalition of Native American Tribes 265) submitted
appeals through DOT’s administrative appeal process on a variety of different issues. DOT rejected all but one of these appeals, which was withdrawn. 266 That being said, the coalition of environmental and government
groups’ appeal did prompt DOT to announce that the notification requirement
in the Tank Car Rule did not supersede the previous notification requirements

259. See Substantive Differences between Final Rule Submitted to OIRA on February 5, 2015
and Published in the Federal Register on May 8, 2015 (June 15, 2015) (summarizing the changes in
the final rule that were made during OIRA review).
260. The Dangerous Goods Advisory Council describes itself as “an international, non-profit
educational organization that promotes safe and efficient transportation of hazardous materials in
domestic and international commerce” whose membership “includes hazmat shippers, carriers,
trade associations, and providers of related goods and services such as packaging, test labs, labels,
warehousing facilities, freight forwarding, software, and consultants and trainers.” DANGEROUS
GOODS ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.dgac.org/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
261. The American Chemistry Council describes itself as an association representing “a diverse
set of companies engaged in the business of chemistry.” About the American Chemistry Council,
AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, https://www.americanchemistry.com/About/ (last visited Dec. 22,
2017).
262. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
263. AFPM describes itself as “[t]he leading trade association representing the makers of the
fuels that keep Americans moving and the petrochemicals that are the essential building blocks for
modern life.” About AFPM, AM. FUEL & PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS,
https://www.afpm.org/about-afpm/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
264. Namely, the Village of Barrington and City of Aurora, Illinois, join Earthjustice, Sierra
Club, ForestEthics, Waterkeeper Alliance, Riverkeeper, Washington Environmental Council,
Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Spokane Riverkeeper, Center for Biological Diversity, and Scenic
Hudson. Earthjustice, Withdrawal of Administrative Appeal of the Final Rule: “Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,”
Docket No. PHMSA 2012-0082 (HM-251), 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644 (May 8, 2015) (June 12, 2015).
265. Namely, the Umatilla, Yakama, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce tribes, and the Quinault
Indian Nation. Brent H. Hall et al., Appeal to the Secretary: “Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank
Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,” Docket No. PHMSA
2012-0082 (HM-251), 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644 (May 8, 2015) (June 5, 2015).
266. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Controls and Operational Controls for High
Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,952, 71,952, 71,973 (Nov. 18, 2015).
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contained in its May 2014 Emergency Order 267—which it had appeared to
do. 268
Seven petitions for review of the final rule were also filed in four courts
of appeals shortly after the Tank Car Rule was finalized, after which they
were consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 269 As of the time of writing, these petitions have all been closed. 270
Only a few months after DOT finalized the rule, however, Congress
passed the FAST Act, 271 which made several important amendments to the
Tank Car Rule. The FAST Act granted most of the major changes that the
AAR had requested in its appeals: It required DOT to prohibit the use of
DOT-111 tank cars from carrying flammable liquids, regardless of whether
they are transported in HHFTs; to add extra safety requirements for tank cars,
including thermal blankets and pressure relief devices; and to lengthen and
adjust the retrofit implementation timeline.272 Some of these requirements
made the Tank Car Rule stricter and were in line with what environmental
groups had requested (and perhaps what DOT itself wanted), while others
served to make the rule less stringent. 273
Notably, the FAST Act also required the Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) and the National Academy of Sciences to conduct two separate studies of ECP brakes. 274 (An earlier version of the bill reportedly provided for these tests to be conducted by a committee composed of the railroads, before the House Transportation Committee required that the tests be

267. PHMSA Notice Regarding Emergency Response Notifications for Shipments of Petroleum
Crude Oil by Rail, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Admin. (May 28, 2015),
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/phmsa-notice-regarding-emergency-response-notifications-shipments-petroleum-crude-oil-rail.
268. Earthjustice, Withdrawal of Administrative Appeal of the Final Rule: “Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains,”
Docket No. PHMSA 2012-0082 (HM-251), 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644 (May 8, 2015) (June 12, 2015).
269. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. United States, No. 15-1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
270. Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. DOT, Docket No. 15-01415 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 2015); Sierra Club
v. DOT, Docket No. 15-01199 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2015); Scenic Hudson v. DOT, Docket No. 1501195 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2015); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials,
Docket No. 15-01194 (D.C. Cir. Jun 29, 2015); Vill. of Barrington v. TRAN, Docket No. 15-02040
(7th Cir. May 13, 2015); Am. Short Line and Region v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials, Docket
No. 15-01132 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 2015).
271. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94 §§ 7304–06, 129 Stat.
1312, 1597 (2015) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20155).
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 222–227.
274. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, §§ 7301–7311; Ashley Halsey, Railroads,
Regulators Clash over Braking System for Trains Carrying Flammable Liquids, WASH. POST (Dec.
19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/railroads-regulators-clashover-braking-system-for-trains-carrying-flammable-liquids/2016/12/19/68071650-9ad4-11e6b3c9-f662adaa0048_story.html.
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conducted by independent experts. 275) The National Academy concluded
that it was “unable to make a conclusive statement about the emergency performance of ECP brakes relative to other braking systems,” 276 while the GAO
issued a report recommending, among other things, “that DOT acknowledge
uncertainty in its revised economic analysis of ECP brakes.” 277 Then, in December 2017, the Trump Administration announced that it would initiate a
rulemaking to rescind the ECP brake requirement, and in September 2018, it
finalized this rescission. 278
At least some of the ways that DOT weakened the rule during the noticeand-comment process look less important within the context of the whole
rulemaking process. For example, although the requirement to adopt ECP
brakes became somewhat less stringent from the proposed rule to the final
rule, the fact that FRA and PHMSA included this provision at all seems more
indicative of DOT’s resilience to interest group influence, given how fiercely
the business community (and in particular, the railroad industry) opposed requiring ECP brakes. 279 Indeed, some reporting indicates that the final rule
was tougher than expected. 280 That is not to say that the changes made to the
rule at the NPRM stage were not important. For example, the implementation
timeline for retrofitting existing tank cars was substantially prolonged from
the proposed rule to the final rule stage. 281 Yet even this change seems like
a less significant concession when viewed in the context of the entire rule, as
industry groups initially resisted imposing any retrofit requirements for existing tank cars. 282

275. Halsey, supra note 274 (“One version of the bill would have entrusted the testing to a
committee made up primarily of the railroads, but others involved in the talks insisted that the work
be done by contractors free of conflicts of interest. ‘The original study was going to be tainted by
the industry, and the House [transportation] committee fixed up the bill to make it more fair,’ Risch
recalled.” (alteration in original)).
276. TRANSP. RESEARCH BD.,NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., A REVIEW OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TESTING AND ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR ELECTRONICALLY
CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC BRAKES 13 (2017).
277. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-122, TRAIN BRAKING DOT’S RULEMAKING
ON ELECTRONICALLY CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC BRAKES COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL
DATA AND TRANSPARENCY 48–49 (2016).
278. Hazardous Materials: Removal of Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake System Requirements for High Hazard Flammable Unit Trains, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,393, 48,396–97 (Sept. 25,
2018) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 174, 179).
279. See Schaper, supra note 239 (describing the railroad industry’s opposition to the ECP brake
requirement).
280. Amy Harder & Bob Tita, U.S. Lays Down Strict Railcar Rules, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2015,
at B1.
281. Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for HighHazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644, 26,647 (May 8, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, 179).
282. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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Evaluating interest group influence over the course of the whole rule
presents a more nuanced picture than looking solely at the notice-and-comment period. It is true that businesses and industry associations appear to
have had a greater share of the policy concerns in their comments on the
NPRM addressed in the final rule than other kinds of interest groups; yet,
there is no such disparity when one compares their comments on the ANPRM
to the final rule. In addition, the final rule is still more stringent than what
these groups initially requested in their petitions for rulemaking in several
respects. Finally, although the Tank Car Rule noticeably granted AAR a
number of important requests, many of these changes were made by Congress, rather than the DOT. Furthermore, several of these changes (such as
requiring thermal blankets and pressure relief valves, and broadening the
scope of the rule) served to increase the stringency of the tank car standards,
and interviews with DOT officials suggest that at least some officials would
have liked to include these changes in the final rule, but knew they were too
costly to get past OIRA review. Thus, even where business influence appears
to be at its strongest, the outcome may not always be to weaken regulations.
4. Significance of Requests
Hypothesis 4: Businesses may be more successful in part because they
make more limited and realistic requests.
This study finds three pieces of evidence that suggest that businesses
and industry associations were more conservative and strategic as to the number and types of concerns that they raised about the Tank Car Rule NPRM.
First, Table 1 shows that businesses, and to a lesser extent, industry associations, on average raised fewer policy concerns with the proposed rule than
individuals and other types of interest groups.
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TABLE 3: NUMBER OF REQUESTED CHANGES TO TANK CAR RULE
NPRM
Commenter
Type

Average Number of
Policy Concerns
Raised

Average Number of
“Main” Issues Addressed

Business

2.25

1.98

Individual

4.03

1.96

Industry
Association

3.53

2.41

Public Interest

5.77

4.24

State/Local

4.03

2.97

Second, Table 3 shows that businesses—and again, to a lesser extent,
industry associations—were more focused on the “main issues” (i.e., the thirteen issued discussed in the preamble to the final rule) that DOT had signaled
were within the ambit of the rulemaking process.283 Table 3 shows how many
of the main issues in the Tank Car Rule NPRM were addressed by each main
category of commenters on average. The disparity between the total number
of policy changes raised and the number of main issues addressed is smallest
for businesses and largest for individuals.
Third, business interests were more narrowly focused on certain parts
of the rule than other types of interest groups and individual members of the
public. Figure 5 shows the proportion of each interest group’s comments that
discuss the five most commonly cited issues, of the thirteen major issues in
the rulemaking described above. 284 An overwhelming majority of businesses
and industry associations commented on the proposed speed restrictions, and
no other issue received close to that same amount of attention from businesses or trade associations. 285 By contrast, state and local governments, as
well as public interest organizations, tended to be about as likely to mention
any of the five most commonly cited issues in the proposed rule. 286

283. All of these issues, except for three—harmonization, scope of the rulemaking, and crude
oil treatment—were explicitly raised at the NPRM stage as well. The results in Table 3 remain
virtually unchanged if you exclude those issues from the analysis.
284. These issues are the ones listed in the “Summary and Discussion of Public Comments”
section of the preamble of the final rule. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,661–26,714.
285. See infra fig.5.
286. See infra fig.5.
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FIGURE 5: MOST COMMON SUBJECTS OF NPRM COMMENTS
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Somewhat surprisingly, individual commenters at first appear quite unified in their focus on the proposed rule, despite the fact that they were the
least likely to have their requests granted by DOT during the notice-and-comment period. 287 Over 71% of individuals’ comments on the proposed rule
focused in part on the timeline for implementing the tank car standards, and
they were not nearly as likely to focus on other aspects of the rule.288 However, this is largely due to the presence of a large number of form letters.
Excluding form letters, individual comments are much less focused on the
timeline issue, and are more evenly divided across a larger number of issues.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that businesses were more conservative and strategic in terms of the issues they raised, while individuals—
and to a lesser extent, public interest organizations and state and local governments—adopted more of a scattershot approach, raising more concerns
that were outside the scope of the rule and addressing more issues.
One possible explanation for these disparities is that individuals simply
were not aware of what issues DOT was potentially open to changing and
which ones it was not. However, while this may be true for individual members of the public, it seems less plausible with regard to public interest organizations, many of which are quite sophisticated. Another possibility is that
business interests are more focused on issues in the rulemaking that the
agency is open to revising because they were more successful at getting those

287. See supra fig.5.
288. See supra fig.5.
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issues on the table at earlier stages in the rulemaking process. In other words,
by setting the agenda early, businesses may have been able to determine
which issues were under consideration in the notice-and-comment phase. 289
Yet the fact that public interest organizations and the NTSB also participated
at the earliest stages of the rulemaking process again suggests that businesses
did not have total freedom in setting the agenda. One last possibility is that
individuals and public interest groups may be focused on signaling their political support for stronger regulations to the agency’s political leadership,
instead of trying to provide nuanced analysis to the agency staff that might
lead to technical tweaks during the notice-and-comment process. 290 Thus,
they may be raising requests that they know have a low probability of success, but which would dramatically change the scope of the rule if they are
successful. 291
III. IMPLICATIONS
At the most general level, the story of interest group participation and
influence in the Tank Car Rule seems to fit quite well with the broader empirical literature: Businesses and trade associations together were better represented than public interest groups and individuals at almost every stage of
the rulemaking process (though public interest groups were represented at
most stages). Comments submitted by businesses and trade associations
were also more likely to be associated with changes during the notice-andcomment period than those submitted by other interest groups. This fits with
the recent empirical literature on interest group influence in the rulemaking
process which finds that business interests still participate more—and exert
more influence—than public interest groups and individual members of the
public. 292
Yet at the same time, this study reveals a few findings that call into
question the magnitude of business influence in the rule and suggest that we
cannot infer from the existing evidence that businesses have captured the
federal rulemaking process. These findings bolster the regulatory system

289. See West & Raso, supra note 13, at 497 (“Placing an issue on an agency’s rulemaking
agenda is important. At a minimum, it . . . establishes the issues that will dominate subsequent
debate. It may also reflect a tentative determination in favor of a particular course of action. As
rules progress in their development, moreover, they accumulate organizational, political, and legal
momentum that can inhibit major revisions in how problems are defined and addressed.” (citation
omitted)).
290. See Cuéllar supra note 62, at 479, 484–85.
291. Id. at 485 (“While the agency staff nearly always dismisses those missives, enough of them
can signal to the agency’s political leadership that the political costs of proceeding with a certain
kind of regulation is greater than anticipated, and perhaps prohibitive. But if the letters are not
enough to pull that off, then they appear to be largely ignored by the agency staff.”).
292. See supra Section I.B.
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against two concerns associated with the regulatory capture view of the rulemaking process: that the regulatory system fails to serve the public interest,
and that it lacks democratic legitimacy.
A. How Much Influence Do Businesses Have in the Rulemaking
Process?
This study reveals four findings that call into question the magnitude of
business influence in this rule: First, while business interests largely presented a unified front at the proposed rule stage on the overall stringency of
the rule, they differed on some important aspects of the rule—such as the
stringency of new tank standards, the retrofit timeline, and the scope of the
rule. 293 In at least some of these cases, some industry groups, such as the
AAR, even took up some of the same positions as environmental organizations, and this support appears to have resulted in a stronger rule. 294 In addition, industry associations and businesses were less unified with respect to
their positions on the ANPRM, with a substantial number of industry associations and businesses calling for the existing regulatory regime to become
more stringent, at least in some respects. 295
Second, although the major requirements in the rule were more likely to
shift in the direction desired by industry associations and businesses than that
desired by public interest groups and individuals, this gap narrows when one
looks at the proportion of specific policy concerns that were fully addressed
in the final rule. 296 Moreover, more often than not, the concerns businesses
and other interest groups expressed in their comments were not fully addressed in the final rule. 297
Third, at least some of the concessions that business interests won during the notice-and-comment period appear less important within the context
of the rule as a whole. Notably, although the final rule was less stringent than
the proposed rule, it was still more restrictive than businesses had initially
desired in several respects. 298 In addition, when we focus on the ANPRM
stage of the rulemaking process, state and local governments were the most
likely to have their policy concerns in these comments addressed in the final
rule, with businesses and industry associations less likely to be successful. 299
Finally, business interests’ comments raised more limited concerns than
individual members of the public and public interest groups. Businesses—
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See supra Section II.C.1.
See supra Section II.C.1.
See supra tbl.2.
See supra Section II.C.2.
See supra fig.2.
See supra Section II.C.3.
See supra fig.4.
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and to a lesser extent, industry associations—raised fewer policy concerns on
the proposed rule, commented on a more specific set of issues, and were more
likely to focus on issues that DOT had signaled fell within the scope of the
rulemaking. By contrast, public interest groups and individuals tended to ask
for more changes overall, focused on more issues, and raised more concerns
that fell outside the scope of the proposed rule. 300
All this is not to say that businesses did not play a major role in the
development of the Tank Car Rule. Businesses were heavily involved
throughout every stage of the rulemaking process, and many of the specific
policy changes they desired were incorporated—at least to some extent—in
the final version of the rule. 301 The railroad industry in particular ultimately
saw a number of its requests fully reflected in the rule, as amended by the
FAST Act. 302 Yet even here, it is unclear whether the railroad industry’s
success is an indication solely of its influence, or whether it also reflects the
fact that DOT regulators believed that several of the changes sought by the
railroad industry would improve safety and strengthen the rule. This latter
interpretation accords with Professor Marissa Golden’s relatively benign
view of business influence, that “when there is conflict rather than consensus
among the commenters . . . the agency tends to hear most clearly the voices
that support the agency’s position.” 303
B. The Implications of Business Influence
1. The Utility of Regulations
This Article suggests that although the recent theoretical and empirical
literatures demonstrate that businesses wield disproportionate influence in
the rulemaking process, the existing evidence does not substantiate the classic “capture” account of regulation, in which “government regulation reflects
the influence of special interests, and is created and operated for their advantage.” 304 To some extent, this should be heartening: It suggests, in line
with Professor Steven Croley’s account, that our regulatory system is still
capable of serving the public interest and addressing major social problems,
despite the existing level of business influence. 305
That is not to deny that the current imbalances in interest group participation and influence are problematic. To the contrary, it seems quite plausible that the current level of business influence reduces the net benefits of
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra Section II.C.4.
See supra figs.2–4.
See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
Golden, supra note 58, at 261.
Levine & Forrence, supra note 8, at 169.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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regulation relative to a counterfactual scenario with less business influence.
For instance, disproportionate participation and influence may cause regulators to weaken needed regulations or fail to issue regulations that would have
promoted improved public welfare if they had been enacted. 306 Professors
Daniel Carpenter and David Moss hypothesize that the level of business influence is likely sufficient to reduce the net benefits of regulation in many
cases, but not so great that the public would be better served by having no
regulation. 307
Yet other scholars argue that in at least some contexts, disproportionate
business influence may yield better regulatory outcomes. 308 For instance,
Professor Dorit Rubinstein Reiss shows that in some contexts, a close relationship between agency regulators and business can yield important benefits—including better information, improved compliance, and avoidance of
unintended consequences. 309 Laurence Tai argues that designing regulatory
processes to encourage business influence can incentivize business interests
to provide valuable information to regulators. 310
Thus, at the very least, although one may still reasonably conclude—
based on the existing evidence—that business interests have too much influence relative to other types of interest groups and individuals, we do not know
nearly enough to conclude, in Senator Elizabeth Warren’s words, that “our
rulemaking process is broken from start to finish.” 311
2. The Legitimacy of Regulations
The conclusions presented in this Article also help to defuse a possible
threat to the democratic legitimacy of agency rules. Regulations’ legitimacy
stems not only from their authorizing legislation, but also from the public’s
meaningful participation in the rulemaking process. 312 Rulemaking procedures are designed to preserve this legitimacy by increasing public access and

306. Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 11–12; see, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Emergency Rooms Are
Monopolies. Patients Pay the Price, VOX (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.vox.com/healthcare/2017/12/4/16679686/emergency-room-facility-fee-monopolies (describing how the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services withdrew a proposed rule, aimed at preventing hospitals from
inappropriately charging higher facility fees, due to industry pressure).
307. Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 11–12.
308. See, e.g., Thaw, supra note 16; Wansley, supra note 16.
309. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (2012).
310. Tai, supra note 16.
311. Warren, supra note 6.
312. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 18, at 627 (“[I]f cultivated properly, public participation can both
enhance the quality of agency decisionmaking and imbue citizens with a sense of investedness in
the workings of the administrative state.”); Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 100 (“Open
government and equal access to decisionmaking processes are cornerstones that ensure an accountable and democratically legitimate Fourth Branch.”).

762

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:700

making regulators more responsive to the public. 313 These procedures include requirements that agencies maintain open records, be inclusive, and
respond to all significant comments. 314 Over the years, however, this legitimacy has been undercut by allegations of regulatory capture and the weight
of the evidence showing that business interests dominate the regulatory process and influence the development of regulations. 315
To the extent that business interests completely dominate the rulemaking process or control regulatory outcomes, the legitimacy of agency rules
would seem to be in peril. Croley suggests that the extent to which business
influence undermines this source of legitimacy depends on the relative imbalance in participation among different types of interest groups, 316 as well
as on the magnitude of business influence—i.e., the extent to which business
interests are able to achieve their desired regulatory outcomes. 317 In a similar
vein, Reeve Bull suggests that public participation must be “effective” to
confer legitimacy on agency rules.318 Carpenter and Moss go further, arguing
that “[t]he widespread belief that special interests capture regulation, and that
neither the government nor the public can prevent this, understandably weakens public trust in government” more generally. 319

313. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 176–89; William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 74 (2004) (“Conservative allegations that agencies
were driven by their own zealotry and liberal allegations that agencies were captured by special
(read: business) interests reinforced the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ posed by bureaucracy’s increased reliance on delegated legislative power. Participation on the record was designed to counter both
types of parochialism by ensuring transparency in the rulemaking process and by forcing agencies
to respond to comments offered by the full range of stakeholders affected by their decisions.” (citations omitted)).
314. Wagner, supra note 14, at 1323 (first citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552 (2006); and then citing Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006)).
315. Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative
Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 476–80 (2012)
(outlining several empirical studies showing that business interests dominate the rulemaking process
and concluding that these findings undercut the ideals of interest group pluralism in the administrative process); Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 102 (“[A] number of scholars, particularly
in the political sciences, question whether administrative processes actually provide this type of
balanced access to and influence over the rulemaking process for all affected groups.”).
316. Steven Croley, Making Rules: An Introduction, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1521 (1995)
(“[P]articipation in rulemaking only by [representatives of regulated parties] might compromise,
rather than advance, agencies’ political legitimacy.”)
317. Id. (“To the extent that participation by regulated parties results in rules predicated on
skewed or incomplete information strategically provided by those parties, participation exacerbates
rather than ameliorates concerns about political legitimacy.”).
318. Bull identifies several elements constituting effective participation: “(1) it should be widespread, including as many citizens as practicable; (2) it should be informed; (3) it should be educational for the participating citizens; (4) it should produce information that is useful to the agency
seeking public input; and (5) it should be conducted efficiently.” Bull, supra note 18, at 627.
319. Carpenter & Moss, supra note 4, at 2.
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Yet the empirical literature does not show that businesses completely
dominate the rulemaking process or control regulatory outcomes. Although
the literature finds that businesses disproportionately participate throughout
the rulemaking process, it also finds that state and local governments, individuals, and public interest groups are often represented. 320 Furthermore, as
this Article shows, the literature also says little about the magnitude of business influence and does not come close to demonstrating that business interests are routinely able to achieve their desired regulatory outcomes. Thus,
administrative procedures should still serve as a source of democratic legitimacy for regulations.
3. Regulatory Reform
Finally, to the extent that policymakers are considering reforming administrative procedures in order to further democratize the rulemaking process, this Article provides reason to favor incremental reforms, rather than
more radical ones. This Article suggests that there is still much that we do
not know about the magnitude of interest group influence in the rulemaking
process and how this influence is affecting the functioning of our regulatory
system. 321 Given this lack of information, it seems wise to proceed with caution, rather than completely restructuring our administrative process. 322
Scholars in recent years have articulated a number of incremental reforms aimed at leveling the playing field, while preserving the main elements
of our current rulemaking process. For instance, some scholars have proposed reforms aimed at overcoming individuals’ informational deficits and
rendering their participation more effective, such as appointing “regulatory
public defenders” to represent the general public 323 or forming “citizen advisory committees” composed of “small, deliberative bodies of citizens” to advise agencies on policy issues. 324 Professor Wendy Wagner discusses several
proposals for encouraging more participation from individuals and public interest groups, including offering monetary prizes and publicity to individuals
or organizations that submit “public-benefiting” comments on a complex
320. See supra Section I.B; see also CROLEY, supra note 34, at 291–92 (“[W]hile one can still
distinguish among regulatory decisions according to the amount of public attention they generate or
the number of outside participants they involve, few agency decisions with significant stakes escape
public attention or participation completely.”).
321. Wagner et al., supra note 13, at 152 (“There is a great deal that we do not know about the
administrative process that we need to know to assess how well it works in advancing the goals set
for it.”).
322. See Ronald M. Levin, The REINS Act: Unbridled Impediment to Regulation, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1454 (2015) (“The current rulemaking system incorporates a variety of controls over potential misuses of the rulemaking process . . . . Congress should be circumspect about
entertaining proposals for drastic changes in this system.”).
323. Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 491.
324. Bull, supra note 18, at 640–47.
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rule. 325 Other scholars have proposed reforms that would further insulate
agencies against business influence, including limiting agencies’ meetings
with outside groups and paying agency officials higher salaries to reduce the
incentives to move to the private sector. 326
Other proposed reforms would more radically reshape our regulatory
system. For instance, the REINS Act would require that Congress affirmatively approve new major agency regulations before they could take effect.327
There is historical precedent for concerns about regulatory capture leading to
radical reforms to our regulatory system. In the 1960s, for instance, scholarship on regulatory capture led to “a curious two-pronged reform movement:
pointing, on the one hand, toward deregulation and, on the other, toward a
new wave of large-scale social and environmental regulation.” 328 Although
the contemporary scholarly literature shows that our current rulemaking procedures fall short of ensuring proportionate access and influence, its findings
do not as yet justify comparable reforms today.
Moreover, even if the level of business influence were sufficient to justify more radical reforms, reforms such as the REINS Act that dramatically
increase Congressional involvement in the rulemaking process would likely
only have the opposite effect. Croley enumerates several ways in which administrative procedures serve to render agencies more autonomous than
Members of Congress and less susceptible to control by interest groups. 329
Similarly, contrary to proponents of the REINS Act, 330 Coglianese and
Scheffler examine the legislative procedures that Congress used in 2017 to
advance two of its most important legislative initiatives, and they conclude
that agency procedures are more transparent and inclusive than the procedures used by Congress. 331 Professor Cass Sunstein argues that Congress’s
“need to focus on reelection, especially when accompanied by the sheer press

325. Wagner, supra note 14, at 1406–19.
326. Tai, supra note 16, at 13–17 (outlining a number of proposals aimed at mitigating industry
participation and influence).
327. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, H.R. 26, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017).
328. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 303 (1984).
329. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. But see Yackee, supra note 111 (finding
that increased congressional attention reduces interest group influence during the notice-and-comment process).
330. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 12, at 32.
331. Cary Coglianese & Gabriel Scheffler, What Congress’s Repeal Efforts Can Teach Us
About Regulatory Reform, ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 43, 52 (2017) (observing that the comments
on these rules came “from a diverse collection of individual members of the public as well as from
businesses, public interest groups, and state and local officials . . . [while] the process Congress used
in repealing these rules appears to have been driven largely by just one segment of society: industry.”).
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of time, increases the risk of influence by—and, on occasion, even near-exclusive attention to—information provided by private groups with clear commitments to one or another course of action.” 332
This case study supports the conclusion that agencies are less susceptible than Congress to interest group influence. Whereas DOT resisted intense
opposition from industry groups and retained the ECP brake requirement in
the final rule, Congress shortly thereafter amended the rule to make the imposition of this requirement contingent on additional testing and research
(which in turn led to the Trump Administration’s rescinding the requirement)
and granted the railroad industry several other changes that it had requested. 333
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to widespread perceptions and allegations of agency capture,
this study shows that the existing evidence falls well short of demonstrating
that businesses or other interest groups exert anything approaching systematic control over the regulatory process. Furthermore, through exploring interest group participation and influence in the context of the Tank Car Rule,
this study suggests that even when businesses are better represented in the
rulemaking process and receive more of their desired changes than other
types of interest groups, their influence may be much more circumscribed
than these factors alone would suggest. It also shows that, at least in some
instances, there may be important constraints on businesses that do not necessarily show up when examining imbalances in interest group participation
or high-level rule changes to rules during the notice-and-comment process.
This in turn suggests that businesses may have less influence, and regulators
may have more independence, than has been represented.
Recognizing the limits of business influence in the rulemaking process
has important implications for the utility of our regulatory system, for its legitimacy, and for how this system should be reformed. As discussed above,
there are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the level of business influence in the rulemaking process, even if the business interests do not control
this process. Yet by painting an exaggerated portrait of this influence, the
332. Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1607, 1618
(2016).
333. Harder & Tita, supra note 280 (For example, Acting Director Sarah Feinberg reacted impassively to railroad companies’ protests, noting that “the railroads have ‘been quite vocal they find
ECP brakes to be both expensive and logistically challenging. But FRA is a safety agency. We’re
not an agency with a goal of making things convenient or inexpensive for industry. Our entire goal
and mission is safety.’”). This is not to say that maintaining the ECP brake requirement was necessarily the right policy. The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently published a report
finding fault with DOT’s estimates of the benefits of the requirement. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 277.
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capture account risks further undermining public trust in government and
leading to unnecessary or unwise regulatory reforms, some of which could
even augment business influence in the regulatory process. The unwarranted
perception that businesses control the rulemaking process has helped to undermine public trust in regulatory agencies and has been used to justify radical reforms to the regulatory process, such as the REINS Act. 334 Developing
a better understanding of the extent and limits of business influence in the
rulemaking process may help to rebut some of the cynicism about regulation,
where warranted. Where such cynicism is justified, it may help policymakers
focus on reforms that will ensure participation by a more representative
cross-section of interest groups and individual members of the public and
lead to a regulatory process that better serves the public interest.

334. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
Data Source
The main source of data for this study is the public submissions to the
DOT on the Tank Car Rule, along with the rule itself and the FAST Act
amendments to the rule. Over 400 different interest groups (including businesses, state and local governments, and non-profit organizations), along
with an even larger number of individual members of the public, participated
in the regulatory process for the Tank Car Rule. Together, they submitted
over 3300 public submissions to the DOT concerning the rule, including petitions for rulemaking, comments on different versions of the rule, and appeals of the final rule. I downloaded all of the documents labeled “Public
Submissions” from the docket folder on regulations.gov.
Coding and Analysis
Drawing on the work of other empirical researchers who have examined
the role of interest groups in the rulemaking process, I developed a set of
coding questions designed to document important characteristics of these
groups, the positions they took on the rule, how they participated in the rulemaking process, and whether the rule ultimately reflected their desired outcomes. I personally coded all of the public submissions on the rule. I cleaned
and analyzed the data in Stata 13.1 but exported it to Excel to create all of the
figures. Stata code is available upon request.
To validate my results after I had finished coding all of the submissions,
I trained a law student in the coding methodology and he independently recoded a random sample of eighty-nine (approximately 2.5%) of the public
submissions on the rule. Thirty of these submissions were scored as nonform letters (again approximately 2.5% of all the non-form letter submissions). I then separately computed inter-coder reliability scores first for all
the observations and then for only the non-form letters. For the categorical
variables (such as the type of organization participating in the rule), I computed the percent agreement. I also computed Fleiss’s Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha for variables which had sufficient observations. For the continuous variables (such as the number of words in each comment), I
computed bivariate correlations. Following Professors Wendy Wagner,
Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters, I generally only report data that have
above 75% reliability and note in footnotes when reliability falls below this
level. 335

335. Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 156.
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I also supplemented my analysis by conducting informal interviews (on
the condition of maintaining anonymity) with agency staff and private stakeholders who were involved in the rulemaking process. They provided extremely helpful background on the development of the rule, and they helped
me to understand some of the more technical aspects of the rule and how it
evolved throughout the rulemaking process.
Notes on Coding Categories
I categorized the participants in the rulemaking using categories similar
to those used by Wagner, Barnes, and Peters, 336 Professors Jason and Susan
Webb Yackee, 337 and Professor Cary Coglianese 338: Business, Industry association, Non-Profit/Public interest group, State/Local government, Member
of Congress, Other federal government, Native American tribe, Individual,
and Other. I marked any and all categories that applied to each organization.
For some organizations, multiple categories applied (for example, a nonprofit organization that represents local governments). To determine how to
categorize an organization, I looked first at how the organization describes
itself in its submission. If the submission does not make clear what type of
organization it is, then I performed a simple Google search for the organization.
To code the form of the participation in the rulemaking, I referred to the
description of the submission on regulations.gov and the text of the submission itself, and I compared the date it was uploaded to regulations.gov to the
timeline of the rule. I then examined whether the participation was asking
for the rule to become more or less stringent overall. If the submission predated the NPRM (for example, if it was a petition for rulemaking or a comment on ANPRM), then I coded whether the participant was generally advocating for the existing regulatory regime to become more or less stringent.
I coded influence in two main ways: First, I examined whether the participant was asking for one of the major issues in the rulemaking—as outlined
by DOT—to become more or less stringent, and whether that part of the rule
subsequently became more or less stringent (labeled as “Influence 1” in Figure 2). If the submission pre-dated the NPRM (for example, if it is a petition
for rulemaking or a comment on ANPRM), then I coded whether the participant was advocating for the existing regulatory regime to become more or
less stringent. To discern how the rule changed, I primarily relied on DOT’s
discussion in the ANPRM, the NPRM, the final rule, and the amendments to
the final rule in the FAST Act. To corroborate my understanding of how the

336. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13.
337. See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 13.
338. See Coglianese, supra note 54.
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rule evolved, I conducted informal interviews with government officials and
private parties involved in the rulemaking process and referred to media accounts of the rule.
This method is very similar to the content analysis methodology that
Professor Susan Webb Yackee developed and has used in numerous papers. 339 However, because the rule is quite long and complex and each comment involves multiple requests for change, I analyze influence at the “major
issue” level, rather than at the rule-level, following Wagner, Barnes, and Peters 340 Yet unlike Wagner, Barnes, and Peters because my study is limited to
a single rule, I analyze the actual comment letters, rather than relying on the
requests summarized in the preamble to the final rule. To determine whether
each section of the rule became more or less stringent, I drew on the summary
of these changes in the preamble to the final rule, and particularly Table 2 in
the final rule, which summarizes the changes to most of the major parts of
the rule from the proposed rule stage to the final rule stage.
Second, I attempted to estimate the proportion of policy concerns raised
in the submission that were fully addressed in the final rule (labeled as “Influence 2” in Figure 2). This method is similar to one used by Justice
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, 341 who recorded the total number of suggestions
raised in each comment that were addressed by changes in the rule, along
with whether any suggestion in the comment was addressed. Like Cuéllar, I
counted a policy concern as being “adopted” if “the agency makes precisely
the change requested by a comment” or if “the agency makes a change that
renders moot the concerns raised in the comments in question.” 342 However,
whereas Cuéllar also counted cases where the agency explicitly states in the
final rule preamble that “a particular change was made in response to concerns raised in comments like the one in question,” 343 I counted such changes
only where the agency fully adopted the commenter’s request or rendered it
moot.
When tallying up the number of policy concerns, I did not count comments that addressed issues entirely outside the scope of the rulemaking (e.g.,
stopping fracking, taxing carbon emissions). I also counted policy concerns
only, not concerns with PHMSA’s analysis of the rule. I did not code documents that commenters did not write (for example, if a commenter uploaded
a New York Times article about the Tank Car Rule). If someone endorsed a
proposal written by another person or organization, then I coded that endorsement only if the commenter describes the concerns addressed in that proposal
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
See Wagner et al, supra note 13.
See Cuéllar, supra note 62, at 433–34.
Id.
Id.

770

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:700

(for example, I did not code a comment that just says, “I support Mr. Smith’s
concerns with the rule”). If someone endorsed another proposal, I counted
that as successful only if that entire proposal was adopted.
Comments discussing how stringent the standards should be for new and
existing tank cars often addressed a number of distinct technical sub-issues.
Usually, these sub-issues were lumped together, but sometimes commenters
raised them separately. For consistency and for simplicity’s sake, I treated
policy suggestions about tank car design standards as a single concern. I also
did not track whether comments were later addressed in a separate rulemaking process. For example, a number of commenters requested that PHMSA
require that shippers come up with comprehensive oil spill response plans, a
concern which PHMSA stated it was addressing in a separate rulemaking.
To measure the sophistication of participants, I used a series of questions developed by Cuéllar: (1) “Did the commenter distinguish the regulation from the statutory requirements?”; (2) “Did the commenter . . . indicat[e]
an understanding of the statutory requirement?”; (3) “Did the commenter propose an explicit change in the regulation provided in the notice of proposed
rule-making . . . ?”; (4) “Did the commenter provide at least one example or
discrete logical argument for why the commenter’s concern should be addressed?”; and (5) “Did the commenter provide any legal, policy, or empirical background information to place the suggestions in context?” 344 Very
few comments received scores of 4 or 5 because very few commenters discussed the underlying statute, perhaps because the Tank Car Rule was a discretionary measure.
Also, following Cuéllar, I attempted to identify as many form letters as
possible by noting if a submission closely resembled another submission.
Although this method was necessarily imperfect and I undoubtedly missed a
number of form letters, I still identified over 1000 form letters (over 30% of
the submissions in the docket). I coded each form letter in the order in which
they appeared in the docket.
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